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THE TROUBLED RELATIONSHIP OF WILL
CONTRACTS AND SPOUSAL




We live in a society with rapidly changing familial norms.' Statistics
show that one out of every two marriages ends in divorce,2 and even
higher divorce rates are projected.' The number of people who remarry
following a divorce also is increasing.4
Much has been written about the effect of the changing family patterns
on estate planning.' In the era when having only one spouse and one set
of children was the norm, it was fairly simple to develop a rational system
for dividing the person's estate among spouse and children. In recent
decades, however, the growing number of multiple marriages has helped
set the stage for a conflict that often occurs between the children from
one marriage and the spouse of another.
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1. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB. No. 89-1923, REMARRIAGES
AND SUBSEQUENT DIVORCES-UNITED STATES 12-13 (1989) [hereinafter REMARRIAGES
AND SUBSEQUENT DIVORCES].
2. Larry L. Bumpass, What's Happening to the Family? Interactions Between Demo-
graphic and Institutional Change, 27 DEMOGRAPHY 483, 485 (1990).
3. Norval D. Glenn, What Does Family Mean?, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, June 1992, at
30 (noting that "[i]f current divorce rates continue, about two out of three marriages that
begin this year will not survive as long as both spouses live").
4. BARBARA F. WILSON, in REMARRIAGES AND SUBSEQUENT DIVORCES, supra note
1, at 1-3.
5. Lawrence W. Waggoner, Spousal Rights in Our Multiple-Marriage Society: The Re-
vised Uniform Probate Code, 26 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 683 (1992).
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Virtually every state recognizes the validity of contracts to make wills.6
Some mechanism also exists in each state for protecting a surviving
spouse from intentional or unintentional total disinheritance.7 A recur-
ring problem arises when the rights of a promisee or a third-party benefi-
ciary of a will contract come into conflict with the spousal right to receive
a share of a decedents estate. 8 Often, the spouse claiming protection is a
second, or later, spouse, and the contract beneficiaries are children from
a previous marriage.9 Courts are divided sharply on who should prevail
in such a conflict, and too often, the holdings appear to rest more on a
6. See 1 WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS
§ 10.1 (1960 & Supp. 1995) (collecting cases on the validity of will contracts).
7. ALA. CODE § 43-8-70 (1991); ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.11.070, .075 (1985); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-2301 (1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-39-401 (Michie 1987); CAL. PROB.
CODE § 100 (West 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-11-201 to -202 (Supp. 1995); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 45a-436 (1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 901 to -902 (Supp. 1994); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 732.201, .207 (West 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-9 (1995); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 560:2-201 (1994); IDAHO CODE §§ 15-2-201 to -203 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755,
para. 5/15-1 (Smith-Hurd 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-3-1 (Bums 1989); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 633.236, .238 (West 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-602 to -6a202, -6a203 (Supp.
1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 392.020, .080 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984); LA. CIv. CODE.
ANN. art. § 2336 (West 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A. §§ 2-201 to -202 (West 1981);
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-203 (1991 & Supp. 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
191, § 15 (West Supp. 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 700.281, .282 (West 1995); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 524.2-201 to -202 (West 1995); MIss. CODE ANN. § 91-5-25 (1994); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 474.160 (Vernon 1992); MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-2-221 to -222 (1994); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 30-2313 to -2314 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.250 (Michie 1993);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:10 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3B:8-1, -3 (West 1983); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 45-2-805 (Michie 1995); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1 (McKin-
ney 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 30-1, -3 (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-05-01 to -02
(Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2106.01 (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
84, § 44 (West 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 114.105 (1990); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2203
(Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-25-4 (Supp. 1994); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-2-201 to -202
(Law. Co-op. 1975 & Supp 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §8 30-5A-1, -2 (1984); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 31-4-101 (Supp. 1995); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22 (West 1993); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-201 to -202 (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 401-403 (1989); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-16 to -16.1 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.250 (West
1995); W. VA. CODE §§ 42-3-1, -2 (Supp. 1995); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 861.02, .03 (West
1995); Wyo. STAT. § 2-5-101 (1992).
For a discussion of the various types of spousal protection, see infra notes 88-127 and
accompanying text. Georgia offers only minimal protection. See infra note 108.
8. See generally BERTEL M. SPARKS, CONTRACTS TO MAKE WILLS (1956); David C.
Minneman, Annotation, Surviving Spouse's Right to Marital Share as Affected by Valid
Contract to Convey by Will, 85 A.L.R. 4TH 418 (1993).
9. See Gregory v. Estate of Gregory, 866 S.W.2d 379, 380 (Ark. 1993). The fact that
the non-parent spouse may have little or no contact with the children of the prior marriage
may exacerbate the conflict. This is so because children separated from a parent during
childhood are much less likely to see that parent in later years. See Bumpass, supra note 2,
at 492.
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desire to reach the "right" result based on the particular facts of a case
than on careful analysis or consistent policy. 10
The conflict suggests the possibility of applying a number of bodies of
law: (1) contract law; (2) property law; (3) probate law, and (4) family
law. Courts .have used some or all of these in resolving this type of con-
flict. This Article explores the conflict in the context of the policies un-
derlying recognition of validity of will contracts and protection of
surviving spouses. The Article proposes a rationale for resolving this dif-
ficult and important issue. Before considering the soundness of the case
law, it is useful to examine the history and use of will contracts and the
structure and purposes of spousal protection.
II. WILL CONTRACTS
Blackstone, the English commentator, defined a will as " 'the legal dec-
laration of a man's intentions, which he wills to be performed after his
death.' ""' In addition, wills are ambulatory, which means that a will is
ineffective until the death of the testator and that a will can serve to dis-
pose of property that the testator acquired after executing the will.' 2
A person has the power to make any desired disposition of property by
making a will, so long as the legislature has not curtailed the disposition
3
and doing so does not violate public policy.' 4 Courts have called the right
to make a will a statutory privilege rather than a natural right.' 5 Addi-
tionally, the United States Constitution does not protect the right to
10. It has been suggested that courts' unsatisfying reactions to the conflict are "not
entirely reprehensible" in light of the imperfect structure of spousal protection. W.D.
MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE app. D at 370 (1960). For a discussion of
the shortcomings of spousal protection mechanisms, see infra notes 231 and accompanying
text.
11. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 662 (Wil-
liam C. Jones ed. 1916) (1766).
12. See SPARKS, supra note 8, at 6 n.18.
13. One common example of legislative curtailment is protection of surviving spouses.
See infra notes 88-127 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Wilber v. Asbury Park Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 59 A.2d 570 (N.J. Ch.
1948) (refusing to enforce wasteful direction in will), aff'd sub nom. Wilber v. Owens, 65
A.2d 843 (N.J. 1949).
15. Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942) (explaining that "[rights of suc-
cession to the property of a deceased, whether by will or by intestacy, are of statutory
creation, and the dead hand rules succession only by sufferance"). Because the state
granted testamentary power, one court reasoned that it could also be statutorily curtailed,
in that case by an elective share statute. See Shimp v. Huff, 556 A.2d 252, 257 (Md. 1989)
(explaining that the right to transfer property at death is a privilege given by the state).
But see Estate of Eisenberg v. Eisenberg, 280 N.W.2d 359, 361-62 (Wis. Ct. App.) (noting
that Wisconsin views the right to make a will as an inherent right protected by the Wiscon-
sin Constitution), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 976 (1979).
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make a will. 16 The right is, nevertheless, one with an impressive historical
recognition.
17
A person can, however, limit his own power to make a will by agreeing
to make a particular disposition and not to revoke it, or by promising to
die intestate.18 The validity of such agreements has long been recog-
nized.1 9 A person who enters into such an agreement not only binds him-
self to the promisee under the agreement, but also may be liable to third-
party beneficiary suits under the agreement. These parties may sue to
enforce the contract,20 sue for damages based on breach of contract, or
ask a court to grant an equitable remedy such as the imposition of a
constructive trust.21
Like any other contract, a contract to make a will requires an offer,
acceptance, and consideration. 2 Although contract law governs both the
validity of the contract to make a will and the possible remedies for
breach, 3 the promisor's power to make or revoke a will technically re-
16. Irving Trust, 314 U.S. at 562.
17. See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of Succession in Social Perspective, in
DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY: ESSAYS AND AMERICAN ASSEMBLY REPORT 14-
20 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed. 1977); Orrin K. McMurray, Liberty of Testation and Some
Modern Limitations Thereon, 14 U. ILL. L. REV. 96 (1919-20) (discussing various justifica-
tions for, and theories of, testamentary disposition).
18. See generally SPARKS, supra note 8 (containing an exhaustive study of the history
and operation of will contracts). For an interesting discussion of the early development of
will contracts, see id. at 1-21.
19. The earliest reported case recognizing the validity of a will contract appears to be
Goilmere v. Battison, 23 Eng. Rep. 301 (1682); see SPARKS, supra note 8, at 1. In the
United States, the earliest reported case seems to be Izard v. Middleton, 1 Desaus. 116 (S.
Car. 1785) (recognizing the validity of will contracts, but declining relief to promisee be-
cause of insufficient proof). See SPARKS, supra note 8, at 11 & n. 32.
20. This remedy is similar to specific performance. The performance, however, would
usually be the execution of a will conforming to the contract, and the court does not write a
will for the deceased promisor. Instead, the court distributes the promisor's estate in ac-
cordance with the will that should have been written. See Wides v. Wides' Ex'r, 184
S.W.2d 579, 581 (Ky. 1944).
21. See Rubenstein v. Mueller, 225 N.E.2d 540, 543 (N.Y. 1967) (imposing a construc-
tive trust on property in favor of will contract beneficiaries). In Rubenstein, the benefi-
ciaries of a contractual joint will asked the court to impose a constructive trust on the
property that passed under a subsequent will that did not conform to the contract. Id. The
court probated the subsequent will, but then imposed a constructive trust. Id. at 542-43;
see also Keats v. Cates, 241 N.E.2d 645, 651 (II1. App. Ct. 1968) (allowing contract benefi-
ciaries to enforce will contracts through an action at law for breach of contract, or through
a suit in equity to impose a constructive trust on property).
22. See SPARKS, supra note 8, at 22. Some courts have held that a bilateral will con-
tract does not become irrevocable until the first promisor dies, leaving a will that conforms
to the contract, and the other promisor accepts the benefits of the will. See Keats, 241
N.E.2d at 651 (stating that a will contract becomes irrevocable once a party to the contract
dies).
23. See MACDONALD, supra note 10, app. D at 366.
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mains unimpaired.24 Thus, the last will of a decedent will be probated
regardless of whether it breaches a contract.2 5 This is true because a con-
tract to make a will affects the property subject to the contract rather
than the promisor's power to make or revoke a will.26 The takers under
the decedent's last will, however, may receive nothing if a court deter-
mines that the contractual rights of others take precedence over the tak-
ers' rights.27 The same is generally true when the rights of beneficiaries
under a contract conflict with the rights of intestate heirs.28
Finally, courts have rejected the argument that one with no property
gives no consideration for a will contract. 9 Rather, these courts have
held that the mutual promise to execute a will for the disposition of prop-
erty is sufficient consideration to support the contract.3°
A. Purposes of Will Contracts
Contracts to make wills are often an estate planning device. To a lesser
extent, they can serve as a tool for resolving family disputes or as a busi-
ness device, but their primary purpose generally is to carry out an estate
plan. Consider, for example, Carol and David, a happily married couple
with no children. The couple's estate planning goal is to have the survi-
vor of them enjoy the couple's combined wealth for his or her life. At the
death of the survivor, Carol and David would like one half of their com-
bined wealth to pass to Carol's heirs, and the other half to pass to David's
heirs. The simplest, most effective way to ensure this disposition is for
Carol and David to enter into a contract to create mutual wills.3 1 Carol
24. See Estate of Chayka v. Santini, 176 N.W.2d 561, 564 (Wis. 1970) (holding that the
will itself remains ambulatory); MACDONALD, supra note 10, app. D at 366 (noting the
promisor's ability to revoke the will).
25. See In re Burke's Estate, 134 P. 11, 13 (Or. 1913) (recognizing "[it is no objection
to the probate of a will that it violates such an agreement, or revokes a former will made in
pursuance of it").
26. See SPARKS, supra note 8, at 7-8 (discussing the proposition that the property is
bound by the contract, regardless of the revocation of the will). But see Walker v. Yar-
brough, 76 So. 390, 392-93 (Ala. 1917) (allowing an earlier will to be probated, rather than
probating a subsequent will).
27. See Rubenstein v. Mueller, 225 N.E. 2d 540, 543 (N.Y. 1967) (imposing a construc-
tive trust on property received by the beneficiary of a subsequent will).
28. Note, The Contractual Will and Some Consequences of its Breach, 34 VA. L. REv.
590, 595 (1948) (discussing a second will's beneficiary rights and whether they conflict with
a will contract).
29. See Black v. Edwards, 445 S.E.2d 107 (Va. 1994) (rejecting the contention that,
because a party lacked property, there was no consideration for the will contract).
30. Id.
31. A will contract is not the only way for Carol and David to effect their plan. They
also could place all of their assets in an inter vivos trust. The terms of the trust would
provide for them and their survivor for life, followed by a disposition to the appropriate
19961
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will promise to give everything to David, if he survives. If David does not
survive, she will give one half of her estate to her heirs and the other half
to David's heirs. David's will mirrors Carol's will. The existence of the
contract ensures that the surviving spouse does not alter this plan after
the first spouse's death.
Will contracts; can also be utilized as part of a business plan.32 If, for
example, a partnership lacks the liquidity to "cash out" one of the part-
ners at death, the partners simply could agree to bequeath their partner-
ship interests to each other.33 This type of agreement differs from an
estate planning will contract in several important respects. First, the con-
tract usually affects only the promisor's business assets, and not the prom-
isor's entire estate. Second, the likely goal of such a contract is to
preserve the business rather than to make a gift. A will contract also may
be an integral part of a divorce or separation agreement.34 For example,
a soon to be ex-spouse may promise to leave all or part of his or her
estate to the children of the dissolving marriage. 35 A will contract also
may be part of a personal services arrangement. That is, a promisor can
agree to make a particular testamentary disposition in exchange for the
promisee's performance of a service.36
heirs. However, an inter vivos trust may be an imperfect planning tool for Carol and
David. For example, if assets acquired after the trust is created are not added to the trust.
corpus, the plan will not be fully effective. In addition, the couple may not want the added
expense and effort that comes from administering a trust.
32. See Buehrle v. Buehrle, 126 N.E. 539 (I11. 1920) (discussing the ownership of the
wholesale liquor business of the deceased); Fleming v. Fleming, 174 N.W. 946, 947-49
(Iowa 1919) (debating who gets interest in the life insurance business), reh'g overruled, 180
N.W. 206 (Iowa 1920), modified, 184 N.W. 296 (Iowa 1921).
33. See Buehrle, 126 N.E. at 539-40 (quoting the will agreement made between two
partners). In Buehrle, the Supreme Court of Illinois considered the effect of a will contract
between two brothers who were partners in a business. Id. The brothers agreed to leave
all rights in the business to each other. Id. Upon the first brother's death, the Buehrle
court held that the right of a surviving spouse to renounce a deceased spouse's will and
take an intestate share prevailed over the contract right of the deceased spouse's brother.
Id. at 541; see also Fleming, 174 N.W. at 953 (holding that the deceased's wife is entitled to
her distribution share of her husband's estate, despite the will agreement made by the
deceased and his three business partners).
34. See Estate of Beauchamp v. Eichenberger, 564 P.2d 908, 909 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)
(involving a will contract incorporated into a divorce decree); see also Gerald Y. Sekiya,
Note, Separation Agreements to Make Mutual Wills for the Benefit of Third Parties, 18
HASTINGS L.J. 423, 424 (1967) (discussing separation agreement will contracts).
35. See Beauchamp, 564 P.2d 908, 909 (1977).
36. In re Estate of Beeruk, 241 A.2d 755, 757, 759 (Pa. 1968) (holding that promisor's
nephew was entitled to the entire estate under an oral will contract in exchange for services
that the nephew rendered). In Beeruk, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered a
surviving spouse's right to take a share of her husband's estate against the right of a prom-
isee under a will contract. Id. at 756-57. The promisee had agreed to care for the promisor
in exchange for a promise to will to the promisee the bulk of the promisor's estate. Id. at
Will Contracts
This type of will contract differs in nature from the estate planning will
contract and the property settlement will contract, the latter of which is
more of an attempt to divide joint property than to effectuate a quid pro
quo bargain. Additionally, in a personal services will contract, the con-
tract beneficiary's recovery might be by quantum meruit, rather than an
entitlement to the entire estate.37 However, judging by the reported
cases, the personal services will contract rarely is used.
B. Types of Will Contracts
By definition, a contract is any "promise, or set of promises, for breach
of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in
some way recognizes as a duty.",3  The promise underlying a will contract
can be one of four types or a combination of several types. First, a person
can promise to execute a will making a particular disposition. Wills, how-
ever, are by nature revocable until the death of the testator.39 Thus, such
a promise would have little value without the second type of promise,
which is a promise not to revoke an existing will. Together, these first
two types of promises form the basis of most will contracts.4 °
Less often, a person may base a will contract on a promise not to make
a will or on a promise to revoke a will. Such promises are valuable to a
person's intestate heirs, who will take the person's property if he or she
dies without a will. However, such contracts are extremely rare, largely
due to the fact that a person's intestate heirs cannot be determined until
death. Thus, a contracting party could not guarantee that he or she actu-
ally would receive property under the contract.
757. The court held the widow's rights inferior to the promisee's rights because the prom-
isee was a creditor. Id. at 759. But see Gall v. Gall, 19 N.Y.S. 332, 333-35 (Sup. Ct. 1892),
aff'd, 34 N.E. 515 (N.Y. 1893). In Gall, the New York Supreme Court refused to enforce a
will contract. Id. at 333. The alleged promisee, a nephew of the testator, argued that he
had cared for the testator, given up his own business interests to further the business inter-
ests of the testator, and had changed his last name to that of the testator in exchange for
the testator's promise to leave him the residue of his estate. Id. at 334. Although the court
declined to enforce the contract because it was too uncertain, the court opined that even if
there had been a valid enforceable contract, its exclusion of a future spouse or child would
have made it void as against public policy. Id. at 335.
37. See, e.g., Wides v. Wides' Ex'r, 184 S.W.2d 579, 581 (Ky. 1994) (internal citations
omitted).
38. 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1 (rev. ed.
1936).
39: See SPARKS, supra note 8, at 6.
40. See Plemmons v. Pemberton, 139 S.W.2d 910, 916 (Mo. 1940) (en banc) (recogniz-
ing that "[tihe agreement to be enforcible [sic] must be to dispose of the property as
therein provided, or not to revoke such wills; that the wills shall remain in force at the
death of the testators").
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Consider the following example which illustrates the relative weakness
of the third and fourth type of promise. Andy and Ben are brothers.
Andy promises not to make a will in exchange for a $25,000 payment
from Ben. At the time Andy made the contract, Andy's sole intestate
heir under the governing intestacy statute was Ben. Before Andy's death,
however, he marries. He dies while married, and the intestacy statute
gives his entire estate to his wife. Ben is without a remedy because Andy
fulfilled his obligation under the contract-he did not make a will. The
same result would occur if Andy had promised to revoke a will. It should
be noted that a promise to revoke a will would not insure intestacy unless
accompanied by a promise not to make a will.
Additionally, the parties to a will contract may agree to prohibit the
promisor from engaging in any inter vivos transfer that would defeat the
agreement. 41 Even if the parties do not expressly so agree, the court may
read such a promise into the will contract.42 Examples of inter vivos
transfers that would defeat the will contract are the making of large gifts
and the creation or funding of will substitutes, such as a joint tenancy with
the right of survivorship.
C. Is There a Contract?
The threshold issue in any will contract case is whether a contract ex-
isted.43 Because the existence of a contract often results in a serious im-
pairment of the promisor's testamentary freedom,"4 courts frequently
41. See Nye v. Bradford, 193 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1946). In Nye, the joint will of a
husband and wife provided that the survivor could sell a particular piece of real property.
Id. at 166. The wife, who survived the husband, conveyed the property to her daughter.
Id. The court held that the terms of the joint will did not authorize the gift of the property
and violated the contract underlying the joint will. Id. at 167.
42. See Estate of Chayka v. Santini, 176 N.W.2d 561, 564 (Wis. 1970) (holding that an
inter vivos transfer violated an implied duty of good faith in a will contract). In Chayka, a
husband and wife executed a joint will, which the court held was made pursuant to a con-
tract. Id. at 562. After the husband's death, the woman remarried and transferred inter
vivos to her second husband much of the property she received under the joint will. Id.
The Chayka court held "that transfer by gifts inter vivos of a substantial portion of the
property received under the joint will must be held to be violative of the agreement of the
parties and as a matter of law not made in good faith." Id. at 563. In part, the court based
this conclusion on the implied duty of good faith imposed on the parties to a contract. Id.
at 564. See also Rich v. Mottek, 181 N.E.2d 445 (N.Y. 1962). In Rich, the New York Court
of Appeals noted that the parties to a will contract can use the property subject to the
agreement as they please" 'short of making a different testamentary disposition or a gift to
defeat the purpose of the agreement.' " Id. at 446-47 (quoting Rastetter v. Hoenninger,
108 N.E. 210, 211 (N.Y. 1915)).
43. See Rich, 81 N.E.2d at 447-48 (analyzing an agreement's terms to determine
whether a testamentary contract existed).
44. For a discussion of this issue, see supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
Will Contracts
have required a higher level of proof to establish that a contract was actu-
ally formed.45
1. Standards and Methods for Proving Will Contracts
There are a wide variety of standards and methods for proving that will
contracts exist.46 Because one of the parties to the contract is usually
dead when proof of the contract is offered, courts may require a higher
level of proof than they ordinarily would require for other contracts. 7
The usual rule is that a party must prove by more than a preponderance
of the evidence that a contract to make a will existed. 8 Often, a party
must present clear and convincing evidence that such a contract existed.49
This heightened standard is probably an attempt to prevent the enforce-
ment of fraudulently alleged will contracts.
A recent Virginia case, Black v. Edwards,5" illustrates several of the
issues that arise in this regard. In Black, the court found the testimony of
the scrivener sufficient to establish the existence of a contract. 51 The
facts of the case illustrate a very common situation in which husband and
wife execute reciprocal wills-each leaving the entire estate to the surviv-
ing spouse.52 In this case, if there were no surviving spouse, the estate
would be distributed among eight pre-designated relatives, four of the
husband's and four of the wife's.53 Shortly after the wife's death, the hus-
band executed a new will, giving his entire estate to his relatives, while
45. See Glass v. Battista, 374 N.E.2d 116, 117 (N.Y. 1978) (discussing the high level of
proof required for courts to recognize will contracts); In re Lowe's Estate, 265 N.Y.S.2d
257, 260 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (requiring clear and convincing evidence that joint or mutual wills
are irrevocable), aff'd sub nom. Matter of Zeh's Estate, 276 N.Y.S.2d 635 (N.Y. 1966);
Oursler v. Armstrong, 179 N.E.2d 489, 490 (N.Y. 1961) (requiring clear evidence of prom-
ise not to revoke will); Junot v. Estate of Gilliam, 759 S.W.2d 654, 657 (Tenn. 1988) (hold-
ing that an oral contract not to revoke a will must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence).
46. See generally Edward W. Bailey, Contracts to Make Wills-Proof of Intent to Con-
tract, 40 TEX. L. REV. 941 (1962) (discussing various aspects of proving the existence of will
contracts).
47. See Plemmons v. Pemberton, 139 S.W.2d 910, 918 (Mo. 1940) (en banc) (stating a
rule that the "agreement be established by clear, definite, convincing, unequivocal and
satisfactory testimony"); Bailey, supra note 46, at 952 (noting that a higher standard of
proof often is required); SPARKS, supra note 8, at 25-26 (suggesting a higher standard is
appropriate); cf. Ridders v. Ridders, 65 P.2d 1424, 1427 (Or. 1937) (holding "unambiguous,
clear, and convincing evidence" is required to prove existence of a oral will contract).
48. SPARKS, supra note 8, at 24-25.
49. Id. at 24 n.6 (collecting cases).
50. 445 S.E.2d 107 (Va. 1994).
51. Id. at 109.
52. Id. at 108.
53. Id.
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the wife's relatives received nothing.54 After the husband's death, the
wife's relatives, who were the beneficiaries under the earlier will, sought
to receive a portion of the husband's estate.55
Reversing the trial court, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the tes-
timony of the attorney who prepared the wills was sufficient to establish
the existence of a contract between the husband and wife not to revoke
their wills.56 The court noted that parties may prove will contracts
through the testimony of "competent witnesses" regarding statements of
the testators or implications arising from circumstantial evidence, parties'
relations, and what the document actually included.57 The court stated
further that, although a contract must be proven by "clear and satisfac-
tory" evidence,58 such evidence need not be direct. 59 Sometimes, statutes
mandate similar requirements.
60
Some states avoid the proof problem by requiring that parties put will
contracts in writing.61 Others require at least a written reference to a
54. Id.
55. Id. At an ore tenus hearing, the court found in favor of the defendants (the hus-
band's executor and the beneficiaries of the husband's will). Id. at 108-09.
56. Id. at 109. The attorney testified that he had explained to the couple that once
they signed mutual and reciprocal wills, there would be a contract between them, and that
neither could change the terms of the wills. Id. at 108. He further testified that he did not
put the agreement in writing or include it as part of the testamentary documents because
he thought that both clients " 'had a clear understanding of ... how the ultimate benefi-
ciaries would take the property.' " Id.; see also Junot v. Estate of Gilliam, 759 S.W.2d 654,
658 (Tenn. 1988) (noting that, although a draftsman may not express an opinion as to the
testator's intention as to the meaning of a will, the draftsman may testify to the stated
desire of testators that no contract exists); In re Estate of Beeruk, 241 A.2d 755, 758 (Pa.
1968) (relying on scrivener's testimony to prove existence of contract).
57. Black, 445 S.E.2d at 109 (quoting Williams v. Williams, 96 S.E. 749, 751 (Va.
1918)).
58. Id.
59. Id.; see also Chambers v. Appel, 64 N.E.2d 511, 516 (Ill. 1945) (noting that execu-
tion of a will that did not conform to an alleged earlier oral contract was a factor that bore
on existence of such contract); Plemmons v. Pemberton, 139 S.W.2d 910, 916 (Mo. 1940)
(en banc) (noting that direct evidence is not necessary to prove a contract).
60. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 853.13 (West 1991). Section 853.13 provides in pertinent
part that:
(1) A contract not to revoke a will can be established only by: (a) provisions of
the will itself sufficiently stating the contract; (b) an express reference in the will
to such a contract and evidence proving the terms of the contract; or (c) if the will
makes no reference to a contract, clear and convincing evidence apart from the
will.
(2) This section applies to a joint will ... as well as to any other will; there is no
presumption that the testators of a joint will have contracted not to revoke it.
Id.
61. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 13-2.1(b) (Consol. 1987) (requiring writ-
ten contract in the will itself to create a joint contractual will).
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contract.62 Even in states that do not require will contracts to be in writ-
ing, courts have given strong hints that express contractual language,
either within the allegedly contractual will or as a separate document, is
desirable.63
2. The Unique Problem of Joint and Mutual or Reciprocal Wills
A joint will is a single document that serves as a will for two people. 
64
It may dispose of all the property of the two testators and is not limited to
a disposition of jointly-held property.65 Execution of a joint will may
raise a presumption that the will was executed pursuant to an agreement
whereby each party agreed that the survivor of the two would not revoke
the will. 66 The presumption may be rebuttable 67 or irrebuttable. 61 In ju-
62. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-3-107 (1984). Section 32-3-107 provides that:
(a) A contract to make a will or devise, or not to revoke a will or devise, or to die
intestate can be established only by:
(1) Provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract;
(2) An express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the
terms of the contract; or
(3) A writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract.
(b) The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create a presumption of
a contract to make a will, or to refrain from revoking a will.
Id.
The Uniform Probate Code is nearly identical to the Tennessee statute. See U.P.C. § 2-
514 (1993). Thus, the U.P.C. provision governing contracts concerning succession does not
address the rights of a promisor's surviving spouse.
63. Glass v. Battista, 374 N.E.2d 116, 118 (N.Y. 1978). New York subsequently legis-
lated that in order to be contractual, a joint will must expressly state that it is intended to
be contractual. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRusTs LAW § 13-2.1(b) (Consol. 1987).
64. Bonczkowski v. Kucharski, 150 N.E.2d 144,148 (1958); Annotation, Joint, Mutual,
and Reciprocal Wills, 169 A.L.R. 9, 12 (1947).
65. See In re Estate of Knight, 533 N.E.2d 949, 951 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (acknowledging
that "[a] joint and mutual will is meant to dispose of property owned in severalty, in com-
mon, or jointly by the testators").
66. See Keasey v. Engles, 242 N.W. 878, 879 (Mich. 1932) (assuming the existence of a
contract where a joint will was entered into). But see TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-3-107(b)
(1984) (stating that "[t]he execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create a pre-
sumption of a contract to make a will, or to refrain from revoking a will").
67. See Estate of Chayka v. Santini, 176 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Wis. 1970) (stating that,
although the terms of the will are important, it is the terms of the agreement that control).
The Chayka court stated that a joint reciprocal will itself is prima facie evidence of a will
contract, and its existence raises a rebuttable presumption that a will contract existed be-
tween the testators. Id. But see WIs. STAT. ANN. § 853.13 (West 1969) (altering Chayka
holding).
68. Knight, 533 N.E.2d at 951. The Knight court reasoned that a joint will becomes
irrevocable at the death of the first of the two testators. Id. Additionally, the court posited
that the survivor is bound to dispose of the property in accordance with the terms of the
will. Id. Thus, the court appeared to presume conclusively that a will contract existed
between the testators. Id.; see also Keasey, 242 N.W. at 879 (assuming joint will executed
pursuant to contract).
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risdictions that do not rely on a presumption to prove the existence of a
contract where there is a joint will, a number of factors may be relevant.69
First, the court may look to the language of the joint will.7" Judges have
construed wills that employ plural pronouns as showing an intent to dis-
pose of the collective property of the makers.7' Additionally, the court
may look to the language of the will making the gift to the survivor to
decide whether an agreement existed. A joint will that gives property to
the surviving testator "absolutely" may lead a court to conclude that the
surviving testator was not bound to the plan of disposition in the joint
will.72 On the other hand, a will that gives a gift to others at the death of
both testators73 or disposes of all property under a common plan 74 may
lead a court to find an enforceable contract.
Second, the relationship of the makers to each other and to the benefi-
ciaries of the joint will may lead a court to conclude that a contract ex-
isted. Thus, when the makers are married and leave their property first to
their survivor and then to their children, a court may infer that the mak-
ers intended a contract.75 On the other hand, a court may conclude that a
joint will made by two parties who share a close relationship is not con-
tractual because it is natural for each to wish to leave her entire estate to
the other and not to restrict the survivor's ultimate disposition of the
estate.76
Third, even when two people execute separate wills rather than a joint
will, a claim that the survivor agreed not to revoke his or her will after the
69. Glass v. Battista, 374 N.E.2d at 116, 117 (N.Y. 1978).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 117-18; Rubenstein v. Mueller, 225 N.E.2d 540, 542, 543 (N.Y. 1967) (noting
that the entire context of the will was plural); see Bailey, supra note 46, at 958-59 (noting
the trend in Texas toward the conclusion that plural pronouns imply a joint will made
pursuant to contract).
72. In re Lowe's Estate, 265 N.Y.S.2d 257, 259-60 (App. Div. 1965), aff'd sub nom. In
re Estate of Zeh, 223 N.E.2d 43 (N.Y. 1966). But see Estate of Hoeppner v. Hoeppner, 145
N.W.2d 754, 757 (Wis. 1966) (affirming trial court's holding that a contract existed where
joint will provided that survivor of the testators would be the "absolute owner" of the
combined estates), superseded by statute as stated in McNutt v. First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank,
1991 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1031 (Ct. App. July 23, 1991).
73. Rubenstein, 225 N.E.2d at 542-43.
74. Wiemers v. Wiemers, 683 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. 1984).
75. Glass, 374 N.E.2d at 118; Rich v. Mottek, 181 N.E.2d 445, 447 (N.Y. 1962) (noting
language of will and surrounding circumstances relevant to proving joint will contractual,
"particularly in the case of a joint will executed by husband and wife or by parents inter-
ested in providing for their children").
76. See Edson v. Parsons, 50 N.E. 265, 267 (N.Y. 1898) (noting close relationship of
two sisters could negate inference that reciprocal wills were contractual); see also Ridders
v. Ridders, 65 P.2d 1424, 1426-27 (Or. 1937) (holding wills of a brother and two sisters
leaving property to each other were a "natural disposition of property" that did not, with-
out more, prove the existence of will contract).
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death of the first testator may arise where the wills are reciprocal.77 Re-
ciprocal wills contain provisions that "mirror" each other.7 s
Courts have engaged in much debate over whether reciprocal or "mu-
tual" wills are evidence of a contract between the testators. 79 Most courts
hold that the execution of reciprocal wills is not per se evidence of a will
contract.80 Courts, however, occasionally have held that little beyond the
mere existence of reciprocal wills is required to prove a will contract.8s
Most courts regard the existence of mutual wills as some evidence that a
will contract existed.8 2 Also, the fact that testators who write mutual wills
make gifts to the other's relatives may be evidence that the wills were
made pursuant to an agreement.8 3
77. See Junot v. Estate of Gilliam, 759 S.W.2d 654, 657 (Tenn. 1988) (stating that,
although wills were "mutual and reciprocal," this was not sufficient evidence to prove
existence of a contract).
78. See id. at 656.
79. Id. at 657 (holding execution of wills with reciprocal provisions not of itself clear
and convincing evidence of contract not to revoke wills).
80. See, e.g., id. (stating that the existence of a reciprocal will is not absolute, conclu-
sive proof of a will contract); Plemmons v. Pemberton, 139 S.W.2d 910, 915 (Mo. 1940) (en
banc) (noting that reciprocity of will provisions is insufficient to prove a will contract and
requiring "clear and definite contract" by proof of express agreement or unequivocal cir-
cumstances); see SPARKS, supra note 8, at 27 (stating the presence of joint wills does not
indicate a presumption).
81. Chambers v. Porter, 183 N.W. 431, 434 (Iowa 1921);,see Church of Christ Home
for Aged, Inc.'v. Nashville Trust Co., 202 S.W.2d 178 (Tenn. 1947). In considering a hus-
band and wife's reciprocal wills, the Church of Christ Home court stated:
Where, as in the instant case, the wills are identical in language, witnessed by the
same persons, at the same time and place; and the contracting parties are husband
and wife, it is well nigh conclusive that such wills were executed in accordance
with their mutual contract to dispose of their property in this manner.
Id. at 180; cf Ridders v. Ridders, 65 P.2d 1424, 1426 (Or. 1937) (regarding as insignificant
evidence that the same attorney drew and executed the wills of a brother and two sisters at
the same time).
82. See, e.g., Patecky v. Friend, 350 P.2d 170, 175 (Or. 1960) (holding mutual wills do
not establish that testators acted pursuant to contract, but are relevant to the issue of exist-
ence of contract); cf. Plemmons, 139 S.W.2d at 917-18 (noting reciprocity of provisions, fact
that the same scrivener drew the wills, executions at same time before same witnesses, and
the fact that each testator knew contents of other's will was sufficient evidence to establish
an agreement); First Christian Church v. Moneypenny, 439 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1968) (affirming trial court's decision that execution of reciprocal wills by husband
and wife, preparation of wills by same attorney, and execution of wills at the same time and
place with the same witnesses was insufficient to prove will contract).
83. Schramm v. Burkhart, 2 P.2d 14, 16 (Or. 1931). In Schramm, a husband and wife
executed reciprocal wills under which each gave the other all of the testator's property
until the death of the survivor. Id. at 15. At that time, each will provided that one half of
the property possessed by the testator at death was to pass to certain relatives of the testa-
tor. Id. From this, the court reasoned that "[t]he reciprocal provisions contained in [the
wills] show that they must have been prepared and executed by the two spouses pursuant
to an understanding and agreement entered into by them and for the purpose of making an
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 45:435
The execution of mutual wills is probably the result of an agreement on
a particular estate plan at the time the makers executed the wills.' Exe-
cution of mutual wills, however, probably is not indicative that the parties
intend to create a contract that would cause the wills to stay in force until
the death of their survivor." Most likely, the parties intend that no
change will be made for some indeterminate time. If questioned, each
party probably would state that he or she would not expect the other to
revoke his or her will the next day. Additionally, each person probably
would not intend that, were the other to die the next day, he or she would
be contractually bound for the remainder of his or her life not to change
their will.86 In light of this, it is somewhat troubling that courts do not
always require more than just a preponderance of the evidence in the
case of mutual wills.
87
equal distribution between their respective heirs of their joint property." Id. at 16. But see
Oursler v. Armstrong, 179 N.E.2d 489 (N.Y. 1961).
In Oursler, a husband and his second wife executed mutual wills. Id. at 490. Each left
the residue to the survivor or, if the testator survived the other spouse, then equally to two
children of the husband's first marriage and two joint children of the husband and his
second wife. Id. When the husband died first, the second wife wrote a new will leaving
everything to her two children. Id. The New York court found that no contract existed.
Id.
84. Elmer v. Elmer, 260 N.W. 759, 761 (Mich. 1935) (affirming the trial court's finding
that the husband and wife's execution of reciprocal wills, which left a piece of real property
to the survivor and then to their son, established only that they agreed on the disposition of
the property at the time they executed the wills). The court refused to overturn the trial
court's conclusion that the evidence did not prove that the husband and wife agreed never
to revoke their wills without the other's consent. Id.; see also Alvin E. Evans, Concerted
Wills-A Possible Device for Avoiding the Widow's Privilege of Renunciation, 33 Ky. L.J.
79, 80-81 (1945) (discussing reciprocal wills of married persons).
85. See Edson v. Parsons, 50 N.E. 265, 267 (N.Y. 1898) (noting that the trial court
could infer justifiably that execution of mutual wills was merely an act in the testators' lives
"without stronger significance than to illustrate how closely bound up they were in com-
mon habits of thought and of conduct"); SPARKS, supra note 8, at 27 & n.19 (supporting
the proposition that evidence of the same state of mind of two people when executing
mutual wills does not necessarily mean they formed a contract). But see Mack v. Swanson,
299 N.W. 543, 545 (Neb. 1941) (finding a contract based on circumstance and the mutuality
of provisions in reciprocal wills).
86. See Wiemers v. Wiemers, 663 S.W.2d 25, 29-30 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 683
S.W.2d 355 (Tex. 1984). The Texas Court of Appeals in Wiemers noted:
In order to prevail the party asserting a binding contract must prove more than a
mere agreement to make reciprocal wills. The agreement must involve the as-
sumption of an obligation to dispose of the property as therein provided, or not to
revoke such will, which is to remain in force at the death of the testators.
Id.
The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the Texas Court of Appeals' interpretation
of the will in question and held that the language of the joint will evidenced a contract.
Wiemers, 683 S.W.2d at 356-57.
87. See SPARKS, supra note 8, at 27 (acknowledging that "[wihen two people execute
... separate documents at approximately the same time and in identical or almost identical
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III. PROTECTING THE SURVIVING SPOUSE FROM TOTAL
DISINHERITANCE
The idea that one should not be permitted to disinherit completely
one's spouse has led to a variety of techniques for protecting surviving
spouses. At common law, surviving spouses received some protection
from disinheritance through the estates of dower and curtesy.
88
In 1929, the New York legislature abolished dower and curtesy and
enacted a provision that gave a surviving spouse a right to elect to take
the share of the decedent's estate that he or she would have received had
the decedent died intestate.89 Viewing this new statute, the New York
Court of Appeals noted the apparent inconsistency of the old law, which
allowed a husband to leave his wife nothing upon his death, yet com-
pelled him to provide for her during his life.9" The change in the law no
longer allowed such practices.91 The Court of Appeals recognized that
the new statute did not provide for consideration of individual cases, and,
thus, stated that "[p]roper provision must be made for the widow where
the statute is applicable."-
9 2
The New York statute was the first of many legislative attempts to in-
crease protection for surviving spouses. Some have even suggested that
the elective share acts as a deterrent in that it encourages testators to
provide for a surviving spouse in order to avoid the unpleasantness of
elective share proceedings.93
Protection of the surviving spouse has several possible theoretical ba-
ses. The theory supporting a conclusion that one spouse cannot totally
deprive the other of a share of the estate because each spouse contributes
to the other's estate is commonly known as the "partnership" theory of
language there is a tendency to pass too easily to the conclusion that such action must have
been the result of a contract").
88. See 3 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 185-97 (5th ed.
1966) (discussing curtesy and dower).
89. The Decedent Estate Law, c. 229, § 18, 9 1 (1929).
90. In re Greenberg's Estate, 185 N.E. 704-05 (N.Y. 1933).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 705.
93. John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Redesigning the Spouse's Forced
Share, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 303, 313 (1987).
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marriage.94 It has become, without question, the "contemporary view of
marriage.95
Under the partnership theory, a husband and wife are presumed "to
pool their fortunes on an equal basis."9 6 Property acquired by gift or
inheritance and property owned prior to the marriage should be ex-
cluded.97 Commentators also have suggested that the partnership theory,
brings economics in line with behavior.98 The partnership theory is some-
times called the "contribution" theory because it recognizes that each
spouse contributes to marital wealth in a variety of ways, both by earning
wages and through activities that support wage earning.99 Additionally,
the partnership theory is seen as promoting gender equality because a
couple's total resources are shared, and gender-linked roles become less
important. 100
Another theory underlying spousal protection is the "support" the-
ory.10 1 Simply put, the "spouses' mutual duties of support during their
joint lifetimes should be continued in some form after death in favor of
the survivor."'1 2 The term "support" is somewhat misleading in this con-
text because the surviving spouse is entitled to receive the protection
94. Recognition of the partnership theory in the United States began approximately
30 years ago. See COMM. ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 18 (1963), reprinted in UNIF. MARITAL PROP-
ERTY ACT prefatory note, 9A U.L.A. 97 (1987); see J. Thomas Oldham, Should the Surviv-
ing Spouse's Forced Share be Retained?, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 223, 231-33 (1987)
(questioning whether forced share system effectuates partnership theory goals).
95. Waggoner, supra note 5, at 716.
96. MARY A. GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 131 (1989).
97. Waggoner, supra note 5, at 717.
98. See id.
99. See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 93, at 308 (noting that the support burden
includes such activities as maintaining the marital home and providing childcare).
Professors Langbein and Waggoner suggest that the liberalization of divorce law argua-
bly supports abolition of the elective share. Id. at 313. They suggest that disinheritance
comes as a result of an unhappy marriage, and that the unhappy spouse can prevent "un-
justified" disinheritance by divorcing and obtaining a property settlement. Id. Although
they note that "divorce is not a wholly satisfactory alternative to the forced share," they do
not seem to consider that divorce is extremely unsettling and potentially emotionally dev-
astating, when someone might prefer even an unhappy marriage to divorce. Id.
100. Rhode & Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the Reforms, in DIVORCE
REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 191, 198-99 (S. Sugarman & H. Kay eds. 1990).
101. See Waggoner, supra note 5, at 742 (discussing the theory that spouses support
each other throughout their lives and this duty should be recognized after the death of
one's partner); Oldham, supra note 94, at 247-53 (suggesting that the forced share system.
needs reform to carry out its support objective).
102. See Waggoner, supra note 5, at 742.
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whether in need of it or not. 10 3 The use of the word suggests a fulfillment
of a possible support need.
Closely related to the support theory is the notion that protection of
the surviving spouse from total disinheritance is based in part on a desire
to meet the economic needs of those survivors.104 Often, the surviving
spouse is advanced in years. 10 5 As a result, the surviving spouse is often
beyond the working years. 10 6 Thus, protection from economic disaster is
an important impetus for spousal protection.
Some courts also note the state's interest in protecting the surviving
spouse.'0 7 Thus, at its heart, spousal protection reflects a compromise.
The legislature that enacts a form of spousal protection has chosen to
curtail testamentary freedom to further another set of goals.0 8
A. Types of Spousal Protection
Most common-law states have chosen to protect the surviving spouse
from total intentional disinheritance by providing for an elective share. 0 9
An elective share statute gives the surviving spouse the right to elect to
receive some portion of the deceased spouse's estate, even if the de-
ceased spouse has left a valid will disinheriting the surviving spouse." 0
103. See Oldham, supra note 94, at 247-48 (urging that support responsibility be limited
to only those marriages that are long-lasting and involve raising children); Langbein &
Waggoner, supra note 93, at 307-08 (noting that spousal need is not a prerequisite to re-
ceiving a share under most forced-share statutes).
104. See Waggoner, supra note 5, at 710 (noting that because of life expectancy and




107. See Hamilton v. Hamilton, 879 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Ark. 1994) (recognizing the bal-
ance that elective share provisions draw between a person's right to dispose of property
upon death and state's interest in protecting the surviving spouse); Estate of Dahlmann v.
Estate of Dahlmann, 668 S.W.2d 520, 521 (Ark. 1984) (citing a state statute that protects
surviving spouse's interest).
108. See Hamilton, 879 S.W.2d at 419 (suggesting that it is appropriate to balance testa-
mentary freedom against state interest in protecting surviving spouse). But see GA. CODE
ANN. § 53-2-9 (Michie 1995) (allowing complete testamentary exclusion of surviving
spouse). Although Georgia allows total spousal disinheritance, a surviving spouse may be
able to obtain a year's support from the deceased spouse's estate. Id. § 53-5-2. The statute
allowing the year's support, however, may be circumvented through the use of inter vivos
transfers. See Peter H. Strott, Note, Preventing Spousal Disinheritance in Georgia, 19 GA.
L. REv. 427, 439 (1985) (discussing avoidance of year's support statute).
109. See Waggoner, supra note 5, at 720.
110. Id.
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The assets used in calculating the surviving spouse's share may or may
not include assets outside the deceased spouse's probate estate. 1 '
Critics of elective share statutes argue that the statutes fail to recognize
effectively the partnership theory of marriage because the share to which
a surviving spouse is entitled often is unrelated to the contribution the
surviving spouse made to the marital wealth." 2 The recent revisions to
the Uniform Probate Code redesigned the elective share in an attempt to
address such concerns."
13
In community property states," 4 a surviving spouse is entitled to one
half of the community property at the death of a spouse." 5 Put another
way, each spouse can dispose of one half of the community property at
death." 6 Community property is property acquired during the marriage
other than property acquired by gift or inheritance.' 1 7
Many states also protect the pretermitted spouse, i.e., the unintention-
ally disinherited spouse."18 The policy underlying the protection of a
pretermitted spouse is the notion that the law should protect a spouse
111. Beginning in the 1960s, elective share jurisprudence increasingly evidenced an at-
tempt to prevent a spouse from defeating the elective share by making nonprobate trans-
fers. See MACDONALD, supra note 10, at 15-17. The 1969 version of the U.P.C. introduced
the concept of the augmented estate, and many states followed suit. See generally John H.
Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1108 (1984) (discussing the causes and repercussions of the nonprobate
revolution).
112. See Waggoner, supra note 5, at 720-23 (providing examples that illustrate the in-
consistency of the partnership theory and elective share law); Oldham, supra note 94, at
229-33.
113. U.P.C. §§ 2-201 to 207 (1993); see infra notes 255-60. For an excellent discussion
of the redesigned U.P.C. elective share authored by one of the driving forces behind the
revisions, see Waggoner, supra note 5, at 715-48.
114. The eight community property states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. In addition, Wisconsin has enacted a ver-
sion of the Uniform Marital Property Act, essentially making it a ninth community prop-
erty state.
115. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3101 (1991); CAL. PROB. CODE § 100 (West 1991);
IDAHO CODE § 15-2-501 (1983); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2336 (West 1985); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 123.250 (Michie 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-805 (Michie 1995); TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 58 (West 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.02.070 (West 1987);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 861.01 (West 1991).
116. See WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR. & CYNTHIA A. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN
THE UNITED STATES 309-32 (2d ed. 1982) (discussing powers over community property at
death).
117. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (1991); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 760, 770 (West 1994);
IDAHO CODE §§ 32-903, -906 (1983); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2338 (West 1985); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 123.130, .220 (Michie 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3-8, -12 (Michie
1994); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01 (West 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.16.010,
.020, .030 (West 1986); Wis. STAT. Ar. § 766.31 (West 1993); 4A R. POWELL, REAL PROP-
ERTY §§ 625.1, 625.2[1] (Rev. ed. Rohan 1982).
118. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2301 (1995); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6560 (West 1991).
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who the testator did not consider a spouse at the time the testator wrote
the will." 9 In that case, if the testator makes no provision in his will for a
spouse, it is reasonable to conclude that the spouse who the testator mar-
ried after making the will was unintentionally, rather than intentionally,
disinherited. Additionally, if the testator made a will in contemplation of
marriage, the alleged pretermitted spouse may bear the burden of prov-
ing that the disinheritance was unintentional.
120
The Uniform Probate Code also protects spouses from unintentional
disinheritance. 121 Section 2-301 provides that an omitted spouse is enti-
tled to an intestate share of the portion of the deceased spouse's estate
that is not devised to a child of the deceased spouse from a prior marriage
or to a descendant of such a child.' 22 The surviving omitted spouse can
choose to take an intestate share under section 2-301 or an elective share
under section 2-201.123
Finally, some have proposed spousal protection of the sort used in the
United Kingdom-the family maintenance system.124 Under a family
maintenance system, a court has discretion to order payments from an
estate to provide for a testator's wife, and perhaps also for surviving chil-
dren.1 25 The family maintenance system permits broad judicial discretion
and increases the possibility of litigation, making it unlikely that the fam-
ily maintenance system will replace either the elective. share system or the
community property system in the United States.
126
Thus, the protection of a surviving spouse from total disinheritance is
one of the most widely recognized principles of probate law in this coun-
try. Perhaps this strong protection of surviving spouses is also a result of
the recognition in the United States that marriage is the most important
family relationship.127
119. See Estate of Ganier v. Estate of Ganier, 418 So. 2d 256, 261 (Fla. 1982) (stating
that "[t]he primary purpose of the pretermitted spouse rule is to assure that the decedent
spouse considered the surviving spouse as a spouse when making his or her will").
120. See id. (noting importance of " 'contemplation of marriage'" determination).
121. U.P.C. § 2-301 (1993).
122. Id.
123. See Waggoner, supra note 5, at 749. Professor Waggoner notes that pretermitted
spouse statutes are rare, perhaps because "the elective share [is] thought to provide suffi-
cient protection against a premarital will." Id. at 749 n.171.
124. See MACDONALD, supra note 10, at ix, 290-327 (advocating a family maintenance
system); cf. Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law
and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1185-89 (1986) (critiquing the family mainte-
nance system).
125. MACDONALD supra note 10, at 291.
126. See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 93, at 314.
127. See GLENDON, supra note 96, at 238-40.
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B. Waiver of Spousal Protection
A surviving spouse, of course, can waive the right to spousal protection
through either a prenuptial or antenuptial agreement. The waiver agree-
ment, however, must be a voluntary act by the spouse.' 28 Although con-
tract principles generally govern such waivers, the modern trend is to
view such agreements with higher scrutiny than other types of
contracts.
129
A series of Massachusetts cases illustrates this trend. The Supreme Ju-
dicial Court of Massachusetts addressed spousal protection in Wellington
v. Rugg."'3 The Wellington court held that the contesting spouse must
show actual fraud to set aside an antenuptial agreement waiving spousal
protection. 131 The same court later partially overruled Wellington in Ro-
senberg v. Lipnick. 32 When determining the validity of antenuptial
agreements, the Rosenberg court suggested that courts consider:
[W]hether (1) [the agreement] contains a fair and reasonable
provision as measured at the time of its execution for the party
contesting the agreement; (2) the contesting party was fully in-
formed of the other party's worth prior to the agreement's exe-
cution, or had, or should have had, independent knowledge of
the other party's worth; and (3) a waiver by the contesting party
is set forth.
1 33
The Rosenberg court further noted that courts should judge the reasona-
bleness of a monetary provision for the contesting party according to fac-
tors such as each party's worth, age, intelligence, literacy, business
acumen, and prior family obligations.13 1 Other courts have espoused sim-
ilar standards. 135 At least one court, however, has lowered the level of
128. See Shimp v. Huff, 556 A.2d 252, 263 (Md. 1989) (holding spousal protection could
not be waived by unilateral act of person other than the surviving spouse).
129. Martin v. Farber, 510 A.2d 608, 609 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.) (noting that the court
should guard against unfair antenuptial agreements because parties are in confidential re-
lationship), cert. denied, 517 A.2d 1120 (Md. 1986).
130. 136 N.E. 831 (Mass. 1922) (overruled in part by Rosenberg v. Lipnick, 389 N.E. 2d
385 (Mass. 1979)).
131. Id. at 833-34. But see Rosenberg, 389 N.E.2d at 388 (imposing a duty to disclose
upon parties maintaining a confidential relationship).
132. Rosenberg, 389 N.E.2d at 388.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 389.
135. See Martin v. Farber, 510 A.2d 608, 609-10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.) (holding antenup-
tial agreement not unconscionable, but imposing constructive trust on assets traceable to
husband's earnings), cert. denied, 517 A.2d 1120 (Md. 1986); Estate of Crawford, 730 P.2d
675, 679 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (invalidating prenuptial agreement as a result of "grossly




scrutiny used to determine the validity of agreements waiving property
rights.
136
In addition to waiver through a prenuptial or antenuptial agreement, a
waiver of spousal protection also could be implied from execution of a
will contract. Thus, if the spouse claiming protection was a party to the
contract, the court may refuse to allow the spouse to repudiate a will
executed pursuant to the contract.
137
IV. JUDICIAL REACTION To THE CONFLICT
A. A Typical Case
The recent Arkansas Supreme Court decision in Gregory v. Estate of
Gregory 3 8 illustrates a typical conflict between will contracts and spousal
protection and how one court resolved the conflict. In Gregory, a hus-
band and wife executed "An Agreement to Make Reciprocal Wills and
Not to Revoke Same.' 139 This agreement provided that after the death
of the first spouse, the survivor could not revoke his or her will unless the
survivor obtained the consent of all of the takers under the will.' 4° Pursu-
ant to the agreement, the Gregorys executed wills with mirror provi-
sions. 4' Each will provided that the residue of the estate of the first
spouse to die was to be held in trust for the surviving spouse and the
couple's six children. 42 Upon the death of the surviving spouse, the wills
added the residue of his or her estate to the trust.
143
The wife predeceased the husband, and her property was placed in a
trust pursuant to the terms of the will.14 4 Mr. Gregory subsequently re-
136. Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990). In Simeone, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania overruled Estate of Geyer, 533 A.2d 423 (Pa. 1987), an earlier decision relat-
ing to the validity of prenuptial agreements. Id. at 166. Beginning with the premise that
prenuptial agreements are contracts, the Simeone court opined that the parties should be
bound absent fraud, misrepresentation, or duress. Id. at 165.
137. See Church of Christ Home for Aged, Inc. v. Nashville Trust Co., 202 S.W.2d 178,
181 (Tenn. 1947).
138. 866 S.W.2d 379 (Ark. 1993).
139. Id. at 380.
140. Id. The agreement provided "'upon the death of either party the survivor shall
not revoke his or her will without the consent of all the beneficiaries, devisees, and lega-
tees.'" Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 381.
143. Id. This trust was for the benefit of the children and would continue until the
youngest child was 25 years old. Id. At that time, the remaining principal would be dis-
tributed to the beneficiaries. Id.
144. Id.
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married.' 45 With the consent of the takers under his will, he executed a
codicil giving a life estate in his home to his second wife.' 4 6
When Mr. Gregory died, his will and codicil were admitted to pro-
bate. 47 His second wife filed to claim her dower and homestead interests
and her statutory allowance of the estate against the will. 148 A conflict
arose when the six children asserted entitlement to the husband's entire.
estate.'49 The probate court held that the children's rights to the prop-
erty were superior to any rights of the second wife, 5 ° and denied all of
the second wife's claims.'
5 '
After recognizing the efficacy of reciprocal wills as an estate planning
device and noting the statutory right of a surviving spouse to take against
a deceased spouse's will,' the Supreme Court of Arkansas examined the
conflict between "the right of a couple to contract to make mutual wills
that are irrevocable and that dispose of both estates to third-party benefi-
ciaries, and the right of a surviving spouse to take an elective share." '53
The court noted that the majority view favored the third-party benefici-
ary.'5 4 Finally, the court reasoned that the contract rights encumbered
Mr. Gregory's property and, therefore, the property was not subject to
the second wife's claim.'5 5 Thus, the court affirmed the trial court's
decision.'
56
In 1960 a commentator noted that, in roughly two-thirds of the cases
involving the conflict between the beneficiaries of a will contract and a
surviving spouse, courts had decided in favor of the promisee or third-
party beneficiary.' 57 He noted, though, a trend favoring the surviving






150. Id. at 382.
151. Id.
152. Id. The court cited the Arkansas elective share statute, which provides in perti-
nent part: "When a married person dies testate as to all or any part of his or her estate, the
surviving spouse shall have the right to take against the will if the surviving spouse has
been married to the decedent continuously for a period in excess of one (1) year." ARK.
CODE ANN. § 28-39-401 (Michie 1987).
153. Gregory, 866 S.W.2d at 382.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 383.
156. Id. at 384.
157. MACDONALD, supra note 10, app. D at 368.
158. Id.




The case law is a tangled mess of decisions, some favoring the contract
beneficiary, 16 some favoring the surviving spouse. 61 The rationales un-
derlying the decisions include contract law principles and property law
principles. Some decisions attempt to apply rules, while others consider
the equities of the particular case. Before examining how to resolve the
conflict, it is useful to attempt to isolate the various determinative factors
that courts have used in resolving cases in the past.
B. Considerations in Resolving the Conflict
1. The Creditor/Legatee Dilemma
The "typical" priority order for receiving part of a decedent's estate is:
(1) creditor, (2) surviving spouse, and (3) legatee. In other words, the
surviving spouse usually cannot claim property to which a creditor has a
claim. Similarly, a legatee cannot take property until the claims of credi-
tors and the surviving spouse have been satisfied. The starting point for
analyzing the conflict between will contracts and spousal protection is to
determine whether the beneficiary of a will contract is a creditor or a
legatee.
If the promisee or third-party beneficiary is characterized as a legatee,
the contract-based claim will be subject to the rights of a surviving
spouse. 162 Some courts consider the act of making a conforming will the
performance of the contract, and treat the promisee as a legatee. 63
160. See Estate of Stewart v. Van Noy, 444 P.2d 337, 340 (Cal. 1968) (holding that the
widow was entitled only to half of the half of the decedent's estate that previously had
been inherited from the deceased's brother and which was not subject to the will contract);
Keats v. Cates, 241 N.E.2d 645, 651-53 (11. App. Ct. 1968) (holding the contract benefi-
ciaries' rights superior to those of the second wife).
161. See Shimp v. Huff, 556 A.2d 252, 263 (Md. 1989) (holding the right of the surviving
spouse to an elective share superior to the contract beneficiaries' rights).
162. Buehrle v. Buehrle, 126 N.E. 539, 540 (Ill. 1920) (rights of contract beneficiary
derived wholly through will; surviving spouse prevailed); MACDONALD, supra note 10, app.
D at 369; cf., e.g., Ver Standig v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 129 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Mo. 1939)
(assuming contract subject to surviving spouse's claim because contract to devise not "in
the same category as a debt against the estate").
163. See In re Nicholson's Will, 267 N.Y.S.2d 719, 724-25 (Sur. Ct. 1966). In Nicholson,
the New York Surrogate's Court considered the characterization of the promisee of a will
contract. It at 721-22. The husband and wife had entered into a will contract with the
wife's father, agreeing to will the father their interestsin a bond and mortgage if they both
died before the mortgage was paid. Id. The wife died, and the husband remarried and
died before the mortgage was paid. Id. at 723. The husband's second wife claimed an
elective share. Id. The court distinguished between a contract to convey, which would
make the promisee a creditor, and a promise to make a testamentary disposition, under
which the promisee would be a legatee with an equitable right to enforce the obligation.
Id. at 724. The court treated the making of the will as payment of the obligation owed. Id.
at 725. Thus, the court treated the father as a legatee, and the surviving spouse's rights
prevailed. Id. at 724-25.
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Other courts, however, have treated the contract beneficiaries as credi-
tors, often without any discussion of the creditor/legatee issue. 164 If the
contract beneficiary is a creditor, payment of the claim may consume the
entire estate, leaving no assets for spousal protection.
165
In assessing the creditor/legatee distinction, the position of the contract
beneficiary of an estate planning will contract seems somewhat different
from the position of the contract beneficiary of a personal services will
contract. Perhaps this is because the contract beneficiary of a personal
services will contract seems more like a creditor because he or she has
provided something of value in exchange for the promise of a testamen-
tary gift. On the other hand, the contract beneficiary of an estate plan-
ning will contract seems more like the donee of a gratuitous transfer.
2. The Context Question
It is sometimes generalized that, in the divorce context, courts tend to
hold for the surviving spouse while, in the estate planning context, they
tend to hold for the contract beneficiary.1 66 Sometimes, this is true even
within the same jurisdiction.
The New York courts, for example, have created a strange anomaly.
167
In the estate planning setting, the New York courts hold that the rights of
contract beneficiaries take precedence over the rights of a surviving
spouse.' 68 In the divorce context, however, New York courts allow the
rights of a surviving spouse to prevail over the rights of beneficiaries of a
prior spouse's agreement. 169 The New York Court of Appeals has at-
164. See, e.g., Estate of Beauchamp v. Eichenberger, 564 P.2d 908, 910 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1977) (finding the children's breach of contract claim took precedence over spousal protec-
tion); In re Estate of Beeruk, 241 A.2d 755, 759 (Pa. 1968) (finding that decedent's breach
of contract placed the nephew in the status of a creditor of the decedent's estate).
165. See Beeruk, 241 A.2d at 759.
166. See Wides v. Wides' Ex'r 184 S.W.2d 579, 580, 584 (Ky. Ct. App. 1944) (divorce
context; surviving spouse prevailed); Minneman, supra note 8, at 423. But see Beauchamp,
564 P.2d at 908, 910 (divorce context; contract beneficiaries prevailed); North v. North, 638
S.W.2d 711, 712 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (divorce context; surviving spouse lost).
167. See Rubenstein v. Mueller, 225 N.E.2d 540, 545 (N.Y. 1967) (Bergan, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that different results should not occur depending upon the context in which a
will is executed).
168. Rubenstein, 225 N.E.2d at 543. In Rubenstein, the husband and wife executed a
joint will. After the wife died, the husband remarried. Id. at 541-42. When the husband
died, the widow attempted to claim a portion of the husband's estate. Id. She argued that
her situation was analogous to electing against the will, and the court so treated it. Id. at
544. The court held that the wife had no elective share rights because the husband had
only a life estate and a power to invade the property. Id. Thus, the husband had no inter-
est against which the elective share rights could operate. Id.
169. In re Lewis' Will, 123 N.Y.S.2d 859 (Sur. Ct. 1953). The Lewis court reasoned that
the spouse's property remained his own property after the divorce agreement, and that the
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tempted to justify this difference based on differing equitable considera-
tions. 170 The courts apparently are willing to rely on the idea that the
property subject to an estate planning contract is "collective" property of
the parties to the contract, but that the property subject to a divorce or
separation contract is the separate property of the parties to the contract.
Even if the distinction is reasonable with respect to property owned at
the time the contract is executed, it is illogical with regard to property
that one of the parties to the contract obtains after the death of the other
contracting party. 171 In this scenario, it is difficult to see how such prop-
erty could be considered "collective" property. Thus, the New York
court rationale does not apply well to the short-term first marriage/long-
term second marriage scenario. This may explain why other states do not
draw this distinction. 72
3. Knowledge of the Contract as a Factor
Some courts consider the surviving spouse's knowledge an important, if
not determinative, factor in resolving the conflict between beneficiaries
of a will contract and a surviving spouse. 173 Others have viewed knowl-
edge of the contract, or lack thereof, as a factor to be weighed in deter-
mining the equities of the case.' 74 In some cases, it is difficult to tell
whether knowledge was the determinative factor, or merely an equitable
consideration.
175
surviving spouse could elect a share in such property. Id. at 862-64. In other words, the
New York courts hold that a party to a will contract incident to a divorce retains both legal
and equitable title.
170. Rubenstein, 225 N.E.2d at 544. But see id. (Bergan, J., dissenting). The dissent
would have found the surviving spouse entitled to an elective share in both the divorce and
estate planning contexts because election is a personal right. Id. at 545. The dissent noted
that the "superficial factual differences between [the Hoyt] case and this one do not affect
the common principle which unifies them." Id.
171. See id. at 543. Although the Rubenstein court did not precisely address this issue,
it suggested that the estates of the contracting parties had "merged." Id.
172. See Davis v. Davis, 237 P.2d 396, 400, 402-03 (Kan. 1951) (divorce contract; con-
tract beneficiaries prevailed); Dillon v. Gray, 123 P. 878, 879 (Kan. 1912) (personal services
contract; contract beneficiaries prevailed).
173. See, e.g., Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 113 P.2d 495, 498 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941)
(noting second wife married husband with full knowledge of previous contract); Tod v.
Fuller, 78 So. 2d 713, 713-14 (Fla. 1955) (affirming the lower court's holding that a surviv-
ing spouse was entitled to statutory dower interest when she had no knowledge of de-
ceased spouse's will contract).
174. Wides v. Wides' Ex'r 184 S.W.2d 579, 584 (Ky. 1944) (reasoning that wife's lack of
knowledge was a factor in weighing the equities).
175. See Keats v. Cates, 241 N.E.2d 645, 652 (Il1. App. Ct. 1968); MACDONALD, supra
note 10, app. D at 376.
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Use of knowledge as a factor in determining whether a will contract
should bar spousal protection is unsettling for several reasons. First, it
suggests that the spouse implicitly has waived the right to protection
merely by marrying with knowledge of the contract. In all other contexts,
however, waiver of spousal rights requires a much higher, more direct
expression of intent.176 Second, use of knowledge downplays the nature
of marriage as an affectional union and transforms it into a result of eco-
nomic calculus.
177
If knowledge serves to bar spousal rights, then the premise supporting
such reasoning must be that one with knowledge of a will contract who
nevertheless chooses to marry the promisor does so based on the eco-
nomic decision that he or she is willing to forego such protection.
178 This
simply seems implausible. Furthermore, in light of the conflicting judicial
treatments of this issue, it is unfair to suggest that a person could know
that the existence of a contract would bar spousal rights. Third, if knowl-
edge is a bar to spousal protection, arguably there is a restraint on mar-
riage. 179 A contract causing a significant restraint on marriage would
probably be unenforceable as against public policy.
4. The Effect of a Will Contract on the Property of the Promisor
Courts sometimes have brought property principles into resolution of
the conflict by focusing on the nature of the parties' interests in the dis-
puted property. Courts have used these property principles in a number
of ways. A court may find, for example, that a surviving spouse is not
entitled to a share of the property in dispute because the deceased spouse
did not own the property. Some courts treat the deceased spouse as hav-
176. See, e.g., HOMER H. CLARK, JR., 1 THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES §§ 1.1-1.4 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing antenuptial agreements).
177. MACDONALD, supra note 10, app. D at 377. As one commentator has observed:
[E]ven in second marriages may we not assume that the prospective wife regards
her husband as much an object of affection as a walking annuity? If this be so,
should she be penalized, in a case in which she was aware of her fiance's contract
to make a will, merely because her emotions supplanted her business acumen?
Id. But see Larrabee v. Porter, 166 S.W. 395, 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) (finding the mar-
riage "void of sentiment").
178. One litigant argued that a wife takes a husband "'as she finds him, for richer, for
poorer; for better, for worse.' " Wides, 184 S.W.2d at 580 (quoting appellees' counsel).
This argument could lead to the conclusion that a surviving spouse's protection is subject to
all pre-existing obligations of the husband.
179. Contra MACDONALD, supra note 10, app. D at 377 n.43 (suggesting that spouse of
second marriage could not make this argument).
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ing owned only a life estate in the property with the power to invade
principal.1 80
Similarly, some courts have suggested that a valid will contract leaves
the promisor with legal title to the property in question for life, but di-
vests the promisor of equitable title. 8 ' Such courts frequently conclude
that a surviving spouse is entitled only to a share of property that the
decedent equitably owned. 182
Related to the question of inheritable interests, some courts have anal-
ogized the conflict to the situation in which a person agrees to convey a
piece of property and subsequently marries. 183 Under these decisions, if
the conveyance does not occur before the conveying spouse's death, the
surviving spouse can claim no right to the property subject to the agree-
ment to convey. 184 The underlying rationale is that the decedent's seisin
is defeated before the marriage, and that the title is of insufficient quality
to allow a subsequent spouse's right to attach.
Property law principles also may be relevant in determining the effect
of a will contract on the promisor's property between the execution of the
contract and the promisor's death.'85 Several courts have suggested that
the treatment of the property under the contract may determine the con-
tract's validity. 186 Specifically, a contract promising to divest oneself of
180. Rubenstein v. Mueller, 225 N.E.2d 540, 543 (N.Y. 1967) (survivor took life interest
with power to use principal in aggregate estate); see Gregory v. Estate of Gregory, 866
S.W.2d 379, 383 (Ark. 1993) (following Rubenstein's reasoning).
181. See Davis v. Davis, 237 P.2d 396, 403 (Kan. 1951).
182. Thus, in Baker v. Syfritt, 125 N.W. 998, 999 (Iowa 1910), the Supreme Court of
Iowa was asked to decide whether a surviving spouse's dower interest in real property
should take precedence over the provisions of a joint will in which the deceased spouse and
his former wife agreed to devise the residue of the estate property to the first wife's chil-
dren from a former marriage. Id. at 999. The Baker court focused on the nature of the
deceased spouse's interest in the property while alive, and concluded that the deceased
spouse had possessed no inheritable interest to which a dower interest could attach. Id. at
1003. The court characterized the deceased spouse's interest as holding the legal title to
the land in trust for the uses specified in the joint will. Id.; see Lewis v. Lewis, 178 P. 421,
422 (Kan. 1919) (holding that surviving spouse had no rights in property subject to joint
will because deceased spouse possessed only legal title to the property while others held
equitable title); Rubenstein, 225 N.E.2d at 540, 543-44 (holding surviving spouse had no
right in property subject to joint will because deceased spouse had only a life estate and
power to use principal).
183. See Burdine v. Burdine's Ex'r, 36 S.E. 992, 995 (Va. 1900).
184. See id.; North v. North, 638 S.W.2d 711, 712 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (holding property
contracted to be sold but not conveyed not subject to dower).
185. Estate of Chayka v. Santini, 176 N.W.2d 561 (Wis. 1970). For a discussion of
Chayka, see supra note 42.
186. See, e.g., Estate of Beauchamp v. Eichenberger, 564 P.2d 908, 910 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1977) (holding that deceased spouse's freedom to alienate his property kept contract from
being invalid as against public policy); Baltimore Humane Impartial Soc'y v. Pierce, 60 A.
277, 278-79 (Md. 1905) (holding that a contract, whereby any property acquired after the
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all property, including after-acquired property, may be void as against
public policy.' 87 Retention of the power to dispose of assets during life,
however, may keep the contract from violating public policy.'
88
One of the most difficult questions that arises is whether property ac-
quired after the death of one spouse should be subject to the contract.' 8 9
If there is a written contract separate from the wills, then the issue should
be addressed therein. On the other hand, where the contract is implied
from the terms of the wills, there is often nothing to guide the court in
determining the parties' intent with respect to after-acquired property.
Usually, the court will resort to the language employed in the wills to
determine the extent that the contract applies to after-acquired property.
Thus, the argument occasionally suggested is that a will contract only
should apply to property the testators owned at the time of the first
promisor's death.' 90
One commentator has suggested that a "two estate" concept would re-
solve the after-acquired property dilemma.191 Assuming that there are
situations in which a will contract vests an interest in the contract benefi-
ciary at the time of the contract's execution, Professor Lilly suggests tak-
ing a "snapshot" at the time of any marriage that occurs after the contract
is executed. 92 The property the promisor owned prior to the time of the
marriage would be fully subject to the contract, and, therefore, unavaila-
ble to a surviving spouse, whereas the property acquired after the mar-
riage would be protected in favor of the spouse.'
93
date of the contract by one party to the contract becomes the property of the other party is
unenforceable as against public policy).
187. Baltimore Humane Soc'y, 60 A. at 278-79.
188. See Beauchamp, 564 P.2d at 910.
189. See Wallace v. Turriff, 531 S.W.2d 692, 694-95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (holding lan-
guage "all of the property ... that the survivor may die seized and possessed of" included
after-acquired property).
190. In re Estate of Wiggins, 360 N.Y.S.2d 129, 134 (App. Div. 1974) (Cardamone, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that will contract should not be applied to after-acquired property),
aff'd, 350 N.E.2d 618 (N.Y. 1976).
191. Orley R. Lilly, Jr., Will Contracts: Contract Rights in Conflict with Spousal Rights,
20 TULSA L.J. 197, 231 (1984).
192. Id. Presumably, the two-estate system would not be used in cases in which mar-
riage occurred before the will contract was executed because the promisor cannot strip a
spouse of inchoate spousal protection. See Keats v. Cates, 241 N.E.2d 645 (Ill. App. Ct.
1968) (holding third-party beneficiaries' rights as provided for in will contract superior to
those of surviving spouse because deceased spouse was not yet married to surviving spouse
at contract's execution); Buehrle v. Buehrle, 126 N.E. 539 (I11. 1920) (holding surviving
spouse's right to spousal protection superior to rights of promisee of will contract because
deceased spouse was married to surviving spouse at the time contract was executed).
193. Lilly, supra note 191, at 231.
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Some courts also have suggested that a surviving spouse may be enti-
tled to spousal share rights in after-acquired property only if it is proven
that the property did not derive from the collective property of the par-
ties to the contract. 194 This test places an almost insurmountable burden
on the surviving spouse.
One issue that courts and commentators have failed to address is how
the derivation of property is determined. Professor Lilly suggests that
"reference to community property law principles could be utilized to de-
lineate the estates."'195 This notion is troubling with respect to non-com-
munity property states for several reasons. First, the courts in common-
law states are unfamiliar with the community property concepts that di-
vide assets. Second, the public at large in a community property state at
least may have some concept of how property will be divided at death,
and of how to treat property during life to achieve a desired disposition.
There is no reason to suspect that laypersons in a common-law jurisdic-
tion possess such knowledge.
For example, consider a surviving spouse's assertion that he is entitled
to a spousal share of his wife's wages after the death of her first husband.
Assume that the first husband had assets valued at $100,000 at the time of
his death, and that his widow earned $100,000 in net wages after his
death. Assume further that the value of the wife's assets at her death is
$100,000. Should a court engage in first-in first-out (FIFO) accounting
and assume that the first husband's property was expended to pay living
expenses and that the wife's subsequent wages are still present for distri-
bution? Conversely, should the court assume that the couple expended
the wife's wages and that the remaining assets were received from the
first husband? Perhaps the court should adopt a Solomon-like stance and
treat the assets as half the first husband's and half the wife's?
If the second husband must prove that the remaining assets did not
derive from the first husband's property, then he faces a difficult tracing
problem. Additionally, he may face the assertion by some courts that the
assets of the first spouse can be expended only for the items necessary for
his or her support.
Appreciation that occurs after the death of the other party to the con-
tract presents a similar problem. In this situation, a court must decide
whether the contract binds the property as it exists at the promisor's
194. Gregory v. Estate of Gregory, 866 S.W.2d 379, 383 (Ark. 1993). The Gregory
court did not reach the question whether a surviving spouse might claim spousal protection
from property acquired after his second marriage because the surviving spouse failed to
show the source of the property. Id.
195. Lilly, supra note 191, at 231.
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death; that is, in its appreciated state.' 96 In a similar vein, the court must
consider property that passed to a surviving spouse in a nonprobate trans-
fer. For example, should the will contract apply to property the surviving
spouse obtained title to by surviving the other joint tenant, the deceased
spouse?
1 97
5. Reliance on Equity
Some courts unabashedly have stated that they decided who should
prevail based on the equities of the situation.'98 Sometimes, this is based
on the principle that courts will enforce will contracts only if equity com-
pels enforcement.' 99 Stated another way, the contract beneficiaries will
not obtain specific enforcement of a will contract if the equities favor
non-enforcement."' 0 The equitable factors considered vary widely, and.
include conduct of the surviving spouse while married to the promisor,
2 0 1
and the surviving spouse's knowledge of the contract.202 Although ap-
pealing as a device to reach a desired result, a flexible "equities-oriented"
approach is no more appropriate in this context than to decide how much
196. See In re Wiggins, 360 N.Y.S.2d 129, 131 (App. Div. 1974) (holding that the con-
tract covered appreciation), aff'd, 350 N.E.2d 618 (N.Y. 1976).
197. See Rubenstein v. Mueller, 225 N.E.2d 540, 543 (N.Y. 1967). The Rubenstein court
treated the property as subject to the contract. Id.; see also Keats v. Cates, 241 N.E.2d 645,
651 (III. App. Ct. 1968) (holding will contract could apply to property that passed under
joint tenancy from one promisor to the other if the parties to the contract so intended);
Estate of Hoeppner v. Hoeppner, 145 N.W.2d 754, 758 (Wis. 1966) (holding will contract
applied to property that passed from one promisor to the other under joint tenancy).
198. See Wides v. Wides' Ex'r, 184 S.W.2d 579, 582-83 (Ky. 1944). Professor MacDon-
ald advocates balancing the equities between the surviving spouse and the promisee or
third-party beneficiary. MACDONALD, supra note 10, app. D at 372. He suggests that the
most important factors are the spouse's need and the consideration the promisee fur-
nished. Id. Such an approach would be a nice analogue to the family maintenance system
that Professor Macdonald advocates, but it too suffers from the deficiencies of that system,
namely unbridled judicial discretion and the likelihood of a great deal of litigation. See
supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text (discussing the family maintenance system).
199. Arland v. Arland, 230 P. 157, 158 (Wash. 1924); Patecky v. Friend, 350 P.2d 170,
175 (Or. 1960); see also Alexander on Wills § 97. Professor Alexander stated:
Thus it might be inequitable to grant specific performance against the estate of a
decedent who had agreed to will all of his property to another, the promisor hav-
ing subsequently married and the wife having been in ignorance of the agree-
ment. Equity will not enforce a contract where the result will be harsh or
oppressive. And since the law presumes that wills are revoked by marriage or by
marriage and the birth of issue, it may be said that all parties to a contract to
make a will must have done so with the statute in view.
Id. (quoted in Arland's Estate, 230 P. at 159).
200. Arland's Estate, 230 P. at 158.
201. Id. (noting surviving spouse lived with promisor for six years and "cared for him
during his old age").
202. Id. (noting surviving spouse had no knowledge of contract).
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spousal protection a surviving spouse would receive under an elective
share statute.
Consider, for example, the Kentucky case of Wides v. Wides' Execu-
tor.20 3 In Wides, a man contracted to will his property to his wife and
children as part of a divorce settlement.2° The man subsequently remar-
ried, and predeceased his second wife, leaving her a portion of his es-
tate.2 °5 She elected, instead, to claim a statutory share.20 6 In its first
opinion in the case, the Kentucky Court of Appeals noted that the hus-
band attempted to treat all fairly. Even though he breached the will con-
tract by making a testamentary gift to his second wife, the court
characterized the gift as "only a reasonable part of his estate. '20 7 The
court refused to allow the contract to defeat the spousal protection.20 8
It is difficult to see why the "reasonableness" of the husband's behavior
should have entered into the equation at all. The husband who leaves his
entire estate to an impoverished, chronically ill sister to the exclusion of
his rich and healthy widow most likely would be viewed as "reasonable,"
yet in such'a case there is no question that the widow would be entitled to
spousal protection. In short, under the elective share system, no consid-
eration of the circumstances of the particular case is appropriate.20 9
Although the surviving spouse of a long-term marriage seems to deserve
protection more than the surviving spouse of a short-term marriage, a
court must give the same elective share to each. Just because a will con-
tract is involved does not alter the entitlement of the surviving spouse. It
is disturbing, then, that those courts that "weigh the equities" when de-
ciding whether to enforce the provisions of a will contract to the detri-
ment of a surviving spouse appear to stress facts such as a comparison of
the lengths of the first and second marriages, and the promisor's age upon
remarriage.210
203. Wides v. Wides' Ex'r, 184 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1944).
204. Id. at 579-80.
205. Id. at 580.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 584.
208. Id. But cf North v. North, 638 S.W.2d 711 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (holding for con-
tract beneficiaries in case that involved present contract to convey property).
209. Fleming v. Fleming, 180 N.W. 206, 208 (Iowa 1920) (noting that "[t]he right of a
widow to her share of the estate, whether legal or equitable, owned by her husband at the
time of his death, is impregnable; or it is not existent at all"), reh'g overruled, 180 N.W.2d
206 (1920), modified, 184 N.W. 296 (Iowa 1921).
210. See Dillon v. Gray, 123 P. 878, 878 (Kan. 1912) (noting promisor was 78 years old).
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6. Consideration of Public Policy
Some courts expressly have considered the role of public policy in
resolving the conflict. 11 Perhaps the public policy that underlies protect-
ing a surviving spouse should be viewed as a limitation on one's right to
enter into a will contract that fails to protect the surviving spouse.212
Courts have used public policy arguments both to grant protection to sur-
viving spouses and to deny them protection.213
7. The Pretermitted Spouse
Sometimes, the rights of a pretermitted spouse come into conflict with
the rights of beneficiaries under will contracts.2 14 In states that protect
211. See, e.g., Via v. Putnam, 656 So. 2d 460, 461 (Fla. 1995) (holding public policy
favored rights of surviving spouse over rights of beneficiaries of will contract); Keats v.
Cates, 241 N.E.2d 645, 652-53 (11. App. Ct. 1968) (holding public policy favored rights of
third-party beneficiaries of will contract over rights of surviving spouse).
212. The surviving spouse in Rubenstein v. Mueller, 225 N.E.2d 540, 542 (N.Y. 1967),
advanced this argument unsuccessfully.
213. The Supreme Court of Illinois has used public policy both in granting and denying
protection to a surviving spouse. The Illinois court has stated that the public policy ex-
pressed in the Illinois statute, which allows a surviving spouse to renounce a deceased
spouse's will and to take an intestate share of the deceased spouse's estate, compels the
conclusion that a deceased spouse could not deprive the surviving spouse of protection by
entering into a will contract. Buehrle v. Buehrle, 126 N.E. 539, 540-41 (I11. 1920); see also
Wides v. Wides' Ex'r, 188 S.W.2d 471, 472-73 (Ky. 1945). Yet, the Illinois Supreme Court
later stated that "[a] contract to make joint wills which may operate to deprive a second
spouse of her statutory share is not contrary to the public policy of Illinois." Keats, 241
N.E.2d at 652.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland relied on public policy in Shimp v. Huff, 556 A.2d 252
(Md. 1989). In Shimp, a husband and wife executed a joint will that expressly stated that
they wished to dispose of their property in accordance with a common plan. Id. at 254. In
deciding that the rights of the contract beneficiaries were subordinate to the rights of a
surviving spouse, the court relied heavily upon public policy favoring spousal protection.
Id. at 263.
In a view similar to that expressed in Keats, the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that
a promisee under a personal services will contract could prevail over a surviving spouse,
and that such a result comports with public policy because it encourages the care of the
elderly. Price v. Craig, 143 So. 694, 696-97 (Miss. 1932). In Price, a husband and wife
agreed to will their property to a woman who agreed to pay them $75.00 a month for as
long as they lived. Id. at 695. After the wife's death, the husband remarried, and then
died. Id. at 696. In rejecting the second wife's claim for statutory spousal protection, the
court stressed that the second wife had notice of the contract, and that upon execution of
the contract, the promisee became the equitable owner of the property. Id. at 697.
214. In Estate of Stewart v. Van Noy, 444 P.2d 337 (Cal. 1968) (en banc), the Supreme
Court of California resolved a conflict between a post-testamentary spouse revocation stat-
ute and a pre-marriage will contract. Id. at 338. The California statute gave a pretermitted
surviving spouse the right to an intestate share (one half) of the decedent's estate. CAL.
PROB. CODE § 70 (West 1991). Section 70 provided:
If a person marries after making a will, and the spouse survives the maker, the
will is revoked as to the spouse, unless provision has been made for the spouse by
[Vol. 45:435
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the unintentionally omitted spouse from disinheritance, the existence of a
will contract causes some analytical difficulty. In a case not involving a
will contract, it is reasonable to conclude that a testator who did not
make a gift to a spouse, who the testator married after executing the will,
unintentionally disinherited the spouse. If, however, a will contract exists
that precludes a gift to the spouse, then it is at least equally reasonable to
conclude that the disinheritance was intentional-the testator chose to
comply with the terms of the contract.215
8. Timing of the Contract
Some cases have held the timing of the contract determinative. In
these cases, courts have focused on whether the deceased spouse was
married to the surviving spouse who claimed protection at the time the
contract to make a will was executed. Generally, if the surviving spouse
was married to the promisor when the contract was made, then the sur-
viving spouse's claim will prevail over the contract beneficiary's claim.2 16
marriage contract, or unless the spouse is provided for in the will, or in such way
mentioned therein as to show an intention not to make such provision; and no
other evidence to rebut the presumption of revocation can be received.
Id. (Law Revision Commission Comment provides the language of the old § 70). Section
70, which was repealed and later replaced by section 6560-62 of the California Probate
Code, applied to estates of decedents who died before January 1, 1985, while §§ 6560-62
apply to estates of decedents who died on or after January 1, 1985.
In Stewart, the decedent's estate consisted of two, one-third interests in a piece of real
property: one that he owned and one that he had inherited from his brother. Estate of
Stewart, 444 P.2d at 338. The decedent had entered into a contract agreeing that when the
last of the three owners of the real property died, the property would pass to the children
of the property owners. Id. Thus, the children, who were third-party beneficiaries under
the contract, claimed they were entitled to three-fourths of the estate while decedent's
surviving spouse contended that she should receive one half. Id.
The Stewart court noted that the stepchildren could enforce the contract in a court of
equity. Id. at 339. The court overruled the trial court, which had held that each side was
entitled to one half, holding that the pretermitted spouse provision operated only with
respect to the estate assets not subject to the contract, i.e., the one-third interest that the
decedent had inherited from his brother. Id. at 339-40. Interestingly, the court did not
mention that the third-party beneficiaries could have claimed the entire inherited interest
as well because it, too, was subject to the contract. The third-party beneficiaries should
have claimed that property at the time of the brother's death.
215. Contra Estate of Beauchamp v. Eichenberger, 564 P.2d 908, 909-10 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1977) (involving circumstances where a will contract existed and the court concluded that
disinheritance was unintentional).
216. See Buehrle v. Buehrle, 126 N.E. 539 (I11. 1920). But see Crofut v. Layton, 35 A.
783, 785 (Conn. 1896). In Crofut, a father and son agreed to leave to each other their
interests in a family business. Id. at 783. Even though the son was married at the time he
executed the contract, the court held that the wife, who survived the son, was not entitled
to a portion of the property subject to the contract because her husband did not own the
property at the time of his death. Id. at 785.
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9. Interpretation of the Contract
Some courts have construed the contract in a way that prevents any
conflict from arising. 217 Thus, some courts have recognized expressly that
the promisor cannot promise to dispose of all property owned at death,
rather, only the net property owned at death.218 On the other hand, a
number of courts have decided in favor of the promisee or third-party
beneficiary of a will contract based on the idea that the property of the
deceased spouse did not actually belong to the deceased spouse and,
therefore, could not be used to protect a surviving spouse. 219
It is also possible to interpret a will contract as applicable only to the
net estate.22 ° For example, a court analyzing a contract promising to give
one's entire estate could interpret that contract as conferring whatever
remains after payment of spousal protection.22'
V. THE SOLUTION
Consider, for example, the following hypothetical. Joe and Heidi
marry when each is eighteen. Several months after the wedding, they
each execute a holographic will. Each will leaves all of the testator's
property outright to the other spouse, or to Greenstuff, an international
environmental organization, if the other spouse does not survive the tes-
tator. At the date of execution, each owns property worth $5,000. Tragi-
217. See In re Nicholson's Will, 267 N.Y.S.2d 719 (Sur. Ct. 1966) (recognizing that a
promisor can promise only the net property owned at death).
218. Id. In Nicholson, the surrogate's court considered whether a mortgage, which was
the subject of a contract to bequeath, should bear a pro rata portion of the widow's elective
share. In holding that it should, the court noted that the promise to bequeath:
[Wias subject to diminution, disappearance, or vitiation by the length of time the
testator might live in relation to the scheduled amortization, by the possibility of
pre-payment, permissible by its terms, by the possibility of its passing into the
hands of a receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, or judgment creditor, by the possibility
of its being subject to the claims of an after-born child or an after-acquired wife,
and by the failure to stipulate against apportionment of estate taxes.
Id. at 726; see also In re Erstein's Estate, 129 N.Y.S.2d 316, 319 (Sur. Ct. 1954) (net of, inter
alia, widow's forced share); Owens v. McNally, 45 P. 710, 713 (Cal. 1896); cf. Wides v.
Wides' Ex'r, 184 S.W.2d 579, 584 (Ky. 1944) (holding that a second wife is still entitled to a
portion of her husband's estate, even though he was contractually bound to leave his entire
estate to his first wife and children).
219. Lewis v. Lewis, 178 P. 421 (Kan. 1919).
220. Patecky v. Friend, 350 P.2d 170, 177 (Or. 1960) (stating that when a husband and
wife make a will contract, the possibility of the surviving spouse remarrying is within their
contemplation and can become part of contract).
221. See Gall v. Gall, 19 N.Y.S. 332, 335 (App. Div. 1892), aff'd, 34 N.E. 515 (N.Y.
1893). In dictum, the Gall court said that a will contract purporting to apply to the testa-
tor's entire estate would have to be limited by implication to provide protection for a sub-
sequent wife. Id. If not so limited, the Gall court reasoned that the agreement would be
void as against public policy. Id.
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cally, Heidi is killed the day after executing the will. Joe probates Heidi's
will and receives all of her property.
One year later, Joe meets Miriam, whom he marries several months
later. Their marriage produces three children. Joe executes several wills
during his marriage to Miriam. The first leaves everything to Miriam, and
subsequent wills leave everything to Miriam and the children. None of
these later wills makes any gift to Greenstuff.
After fifty years of happy marriage, Joe dies. At the time of his death,
he owns property worth $500,000. When Miriam attempts to probate
Joe's last will, Greenstuff objects, arguing that the will breaches the con-
tract between Joe and Heidi. Greenstuff seeks to receive Joe's entire es-
tate in probate court. Miriam and the children claim the entire estate
and, in the alternative, Miriam claims her spousal protection rights.222
First, the court will have to decide whether there was a contract be-
tween Joe and Heidi. If the court finds the parties had a contract, it must
decide what property the contract covered.223 Finally, the court must de-
cide whether Miriam is entitled to any of the property subject to the con-
tract-whether the contract is subject to a surviving spouse's right to a
portion of the estate.
It is apparent that the haphazard use of property, contract, probate,
and family law principles leads to inconsistent and unjust results. The
cases seemingly turn more on which side could muster more compelling
facts, rather than on any well-thought-out rationale or on any sound pub-
lic policy. Such fact-specific inquiries, while attractive in some respects,
are inappropriate in every other instance involving spousal protection,
and are inappropriate with respect to the conflict between will contracts
and spousal protection.
Before examining how the law should resolve the conflict, it is impor-
tant to consider two ancillary matters. First, parties can avoid the con-
flict, in most cases, with careful planning. Second, an attorney involved in
any way with the conflict must consider the particularly thorny profes-
sional responsibility concerns that the conflict raises, both from a plan-
ning and litigation perspective.
222. For a discussion of the various types of spousal protection, see supra notes 78-113
and accompanying text.
223. See SPARKS, supra note 8, at 16-17 (recognizing that "[tjhroughout its develop-
ment the law as to the revocability of the will made pursuant to contract and the status of
the property from the making of the contract until the death of the promisor has been in a
constant state of confusion").
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A. Avoiding the Problem Through Planning
Obviously, the best way to deal with the conflict is to avoid it. If a will
contract makes clear that it does not affect property that would be subject
to the spousal share of a subsequent spouse, then no conflict will exist.
Similarly, if a party to a will contract enters into an agreement with a
subsequent spouse who waives all rights to elect against the will of the
party to the contract, then the conflict will never arise.
In the case of joint and mutual wills, the parties always should state
whether they desire a binding agreement or not. For example, if the par-
ties intend a contract, then the higher evidentiary requirement could frus-
trate that intent in the absence of a clear expression of intent. Yet, if the
parties do not intend a contract, then a presumption that the reciprocal
provisions are evidence of a contract could cause a result that neither
224party desires.
More important, and more difficult to solve through planning, is the
situation in which a party enters into a will contract that has conse-
quences not contemplated at its inception. z25 The only solution to this
problem would be to modify the contract while both parties are alive, or
to seek a waiver from any spouse whose rights the contract might affect.
Finally, it is likely that avoidance of the conflict through planning will
occur only when adequate legal counsel is available. For that portion of
the population who either do not seek or do not receive high-quality ad-
vice, the conflict must be resolved if and when it arises.
B. Professional Responsibility Concerns
Estate planning attorneys often find themselves in situations in which
they are asked to represent clients with potentially conflicting interests.226
Although an attorney who represents both spouses in a divorce or separa-
224. Id. at 30 (explaining "[tihe rule requiring clear and convincing evidence to prove a
contract to devise or bequeath coupled with the laxity of the courts in the application of
the rule in joint and mutual will cases creates such uncertainty as to require that special
care be exercised in the drafting of instruments of this type").
225. See Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 166 (Pa. 1990). In the context of evaluat-
ing a prenuptial agreement, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that changes of
circumstance can make a desirable bargain become unattractive over the life of a long-term
contract. Id. But, the court opined, contracting parties assume such risks. Id.
226. See generally Developments Regarding the Professional Responsibility of the Estate
Planning Lawyer: The Effect of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Report of the
Commission on Significant New Developments in Probate and Trust Law Practice, 22 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1, 10-23 (1987) [hereinafter Professional Responsibility Develop-
ments]; Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of Multiple
Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion and Controversy, 61 TEX. L. REv.
211, 212 (1982) (discussing simultaneous representation in same transaction or proceed-
ing); Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L.
[Vol. 45:435
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tion proceeding clearly is representing conflicting interests, 227 the conflict
is often less clear in the estate planning setting. Simply drafting wills for a
husband and wife may put an attorney in a difficult position under the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.228 For example, when one of the
spouses later requests a change in his or her will, the attorney must de-
cide whether to inform the other spouse.229 Similarly, an attorney who
REV. 1244, 1247 (1981) (stating that a conflict of interest question "has provided bench and
bar with one of the toughest problems in legal ethics").
The relevant Model Rules of Professional Conduct are Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.16. Rule 1.7
states:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be
directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect
the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may
be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third
person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely af-
fected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple cli-
ents in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of
the implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks
involved.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1994). Rule 1.9 states in part:
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereaf-
ter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in
which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client consents after consultation...
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present
or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:
... use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the for-
mer client except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to
a client, or when the information has become generally known....
Id. Rule 1.9(a), (c)(1) (1994). Rule 1.16 states in part: "[A] lawyer shall not represent a
client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of
a client if. . . the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct
or other law." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(a)(1) (1994).
227. Charles P. Kindregan, Conflict of Interest and the Lawyer in Civil Practice, 10 VAL.
U. L. REV. 423, 438 (1976) (stating that, in a divorce proceeding, a single lawyer should be
precluded from advising both the husband and the wife).
228. See generally Report of the Special Study Committee on Professional Responsibility
of the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of the American Bar Association,
Comments and Recommendations on the Lawyer's Duties in Representing Husband and
Wife, 28 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 765 (1994).
229. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide in part: "A lawyer shall
not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after
consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b)," which deals with criminal acts and
disputes between lawyer and client. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.6(a) (1994); see Professional Responsibility Developments, supra note 226, at 13 (recog-
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drafts wills initially for both spouses but is later asked to obtain spousal
protection for the surviving spouse is put into a conflict situation. 3 °
The fact that the attorney represents an interest that conflicts with the
interest of a former, rather than current, client does not alleviate the
problem. 2 31 A dilemma may arise in such situations because the attorney
improperly may use confidential information obtained while representing
the former client.2 32
The situation in which the spouses' wills may have been executed pur-
suant to a will contract presents several additional difficult issues for the
estate planning attorney. First, may an attorney write wills for two peo-
ple who wish him to do so pursuant to a will contract? Second, may an
attorney change a will when it may have been executed pursuant to a will
contract with another client of the attorney? Third, what role may an
attorney, who drafted mutual wills, take in litigation asserting or denying
that a contract existed? Here the complication is that a party may call the
lawyer to testify regarding the existence of a contract.233 Under the
Model Rules, an attorney must take special caution in such a situation. 34
One commentator has suggested that the rule most clearly applies to a
situation in which the attorney is called upon to testify about a substan-
tive matter in the dispute. 35
The rationales underlying the prohibition against representing conflict-
ing interests include the possibility of confidentiality difficulties, problems
with zealous representation, and the appearance of impropriety. 236 When
the attorney also considers the potential benefits of multiple representa-
nizing that "[i]f the changes are major and clearly affect the other spouse's estate plan, the
attorney is caught between conflicting duties of loyalty toward the two clients").
230. See Professional Responsibility Developments, supra note 226, at 12 (suggesting
that forced election in community property jurisdictions and elective share in non-commu-
nity states by their very nature represent a conflict between spouses).
231. See Kindregan, supra note 227, at 444.
232. Id.
233. Black v. Edwards, 445 S.E.2d 107, 108-09 (Va. 1994). In Black, the couple's attor-
ney testified to the existence of a will contract. See id.; see also Kindregan, supra note 227,
at 429-31 (discussing the role of lawyer as witness).
234. See Lennox v. Anderson, 1 N.W.2d 912, 916 (Neb.) (providing that the testimony
of attorney regarding existence of oral contract is inadmissible as privileged), modified, 3
N.W.2d 645 (Neb. 1942); see Hale McCown, Ethical Problems in Probate Matters, 39 NEB.
L. REV. 343, 346-48 (1960) (noting that, because of the attorney-client privilege, attorneys
may be precluded from testifying as to existence of an oral contract to make a will).
235. Kindregan, supra note 227, at 430 (discussing Disciplinary Rules and Ethical Con-
siderations of the Code of Professional Responsibility).




tion (for example, an overall fee reduction) he or she is faced with possi-
bly inharmonious goals.237
Yet another difficult problem comes when the situation that is the sub-
ject of this Article arises. It is difficult to predict when the present happy
common plan will turn into the unhappy future litigation. An attorney
may be able to resolve the conflict problem by obtaining appropriate cli-
ent consent.238 In many situations, however, the only solution will be to
decline the representation or withdraw because sound professional judg-
ment will forbid representation.239
C. The Solution When the Conflict Arises
If the conflict between spousal protection and a will contract arises,
then a simple solution presents itself. There should be a complete separa-
tion of the two issues. In other words, the determination of the validity of
a will contract should have nothing to do with the decision whether to
grant spousal protection. Rather, if there is a valid will contract, then it
should be enforced. Further, if the surviving spouse would have been
entitled to spousal protection from the assets subject to the contract, then
the contract beneficiary should take subject to the spousal protection
rights of the surviving spouse. To conclude otherwise inappropriately and
illogically dilutes the spousal protection right.
The rights of any taker under a will are subject to the vagaries of the
testator's lifetime depletion of assets and to limits imposed by regulation
of the testamentary power.24° The beneficiary of a gratuitous promise to
make a gift by will should be subject to the same vagaries. The trend in
America has been to protect the surviving spouse more than other rela-
tives. As one commentator has stated, "the position of the surviving
spouse has steadily improved everywhere at the expense of the dece-
dent's blood relatives.",241 In light of this trend, it seems odd that so
many courts have allowed surviving spouses to be stripped of protection
as a result of an earlier will contract.
An interesting parallel exists between the question whether a spouse
can defeat future elective share rights by making an inter vivos transfer
237. Moore, supra note 226, at 214.
238. See Dennis M. O'Dea, The Lawyer-Client Relationship Reconsidered: Methods for
Avoiding Conflicts of Interest, Malpractice Liability, and Disqualification, 48 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 693, 725-39 (1980) (discussing methods for obtaining consent to conflicts).
239. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr RULE 1.7 (1994) (stating the gen-
eral rule, and listing the exceptions).
240. In re Nicholson's Will, 267 N.Y.S.2d 719, 726 (Sur. Ct. 1966) (legatee takes subject
to infirmities of will).
241. GLENDON, supra note 96, at 238.
1996]
Catholic University Law Review
and whether a spouse can defeat future elective share rights by making a
will contract. One court has suggested that a surviving spouse of a de-
ceased spouse who entered into a will contract before marriage is not
entitled to spousal protection because the situation is similar to one in
which the deceased spouse made an inter vivos transfer to obtain the
same result.2 42 In the era when the elective share attached only to pro-
bate assets, inter vivos transfers easily could diminish the elective
share. 43 The recent reforms in spousal protection would, however, often
give a surviving spouse rights in the property of at least some nonprobate
transfers. Whether the surviving spouse should receive protection from
assets in which the deceased spouse held only a partial interest should
depend on what type of interest the deceased spouse retained.
The cases involving inter vivos transfers typically arise when a surviving
spouse has attempted to invalidate an otherwise valid inter vivos transfer
by arguing that it defeated the elective share. Before state legislatures
enacted statutes addressing the availability of nonprobate assets to the
elective share, courts reacted to such claims in a variety of ways. Some
courts simply denied the surviving spouse relief. Others entertained the
possibility of invalidating the inter vivos transfer, usually focusing on one
of two tests. The first test was the "intent" test.2 44 This test asks whether
the deceased spouse made the inter vivos transfer with the intent to di-
minish the surviving spouse's elective share rights. The second test was
the "control" test.245 This test examined the degree of control the de-
ceased spouse had retained over the property that was the subject of the
nonprobate transfer.
242. Lewis v. Lewis, 178 P. 421, 422-23 (Kan. 1919) (employing this rationale, and up-
holding the will as not against public policy).
243. See Newman v. Dore, 9 N.E.2d 966, 966-67 (N.Y. 1937). In Newman, the New
York Court of Appeals held that whether an inter vivos transfer defeated a surviving
spouse's right depended on whether the transfer was real or illusory. Id. at 969. In its
holding, the Newman court noted that the share to which a surviving spouse is entitled:
[I]s only an expectant interest dependent upon the contingency that the property
to which the interest attaches becomes part of a decedent's estate. The contin-
gency does not occur, and the expectant property right does not ripen into a prop-
erty right in possession, if the owner sells or gives away the property.
Id. at 967.
244. See MACDONALD, supra note 10, at 98-119 (evaluating the "intent" test, and sur-
veying the variations of the test in different jurisdictions).
245. See id. at 67-97 (explaining the control rationale and its effect on illusory trans-
fers). Professor Macdonald also notes a third line of cases that apply a "reality" test. Id. at
120-44. This reality test could be classified as an offshoot of the "control" test because it
focuses on who controls or has interests in the transferred assets during the life of the
deceased spouse. See Newman, 9 N.E.2d at 969 (explaining that the ultimate test is
whether the transfer is real or illusory).
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Since its introduction, there has been much legislative reform of elec-
tive share law.24 6 The main thrust of this reform has been to make it
difficult or impossible to destroy future elective share rights by making
inter vivos nonprobate transfers.247
Similarly, some have suggested that a contract must be subject to the
possibility that the amount received by a third-party beneficiary would be
reduced by a surviving spouse's share, or consequently, the contract itself
would be a restraint on marriage.248 Presumably, a serious restraint on
marriage would be void as against public policy.
249
Of course, some commentators have suggested that changes in society
may have rendered spousal protection unnecessary. 25 ° The premise be-
hind this suggestion seems to be that spousal protection was designed to
protect widows, and that the improved position of women in society
makes spousal protection no longer necessary. Even assuming that this
premise is true, resolving the conflict in favor of contract beneficiaries,
and thus eroding spousal protection, is not the answer. There is no rea-
son why a decreased need for spousal protection should override a seem-
ingly clear legislative pronouncement when a will contract is involved, but
not in other circumstances. Rather, if the law of spousal protection needs
reworking, or perhaps abolition, then such changes should apply to
spousal protection in every situation.
Courts appear to give more protection to first spouses than to second
or later spouses when a conflict arises.25 ' This is true even when knowl-
246. See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 93, at 311 (observing that, since Newman v.
Dore, there has been significant legislative reform).
247. See id. (noting that the newer statutes adopt the approach).
248. Gall v. Gall, 19 N.Y.S. 332 (Sup. Ct. 1892), aff'd, 34 N.E. 515 (N.Y. 1893). In
dictum, the Gall court stated "[t]he parties.., could never have contemplated a restriction
upon the decedent's right to marry or to provide for his children in case such marriage was
fruitful." Id. at 335. In Patecky v. Friend, the Oregon Supreme Court stated that:
Marriage being a natural and desirable relationship in the eyes of the law, it may
be said that the possibility of remarriage of either [of the parties to the will con-
tract] was within their contemplation when the contract was made and became a
part thereof. At least, it may not be assumed that they intended an agreement in
restraint of marriage.
350 P.2d 170, 177 (Or. 1960); see also Minneman, supra note 8, at 423, 429.
249. Shimp v. Huff, 556 A.2d 252, 263 (Md. 1989) (noting contracts that restrain mar-
riage are void as against public policy).
250. See Oldham, supra note 94, at 233-54 (criticizing the forced share system, and
suggesting possible changes to reform the system); Sheldon J. Plager, The Spouse's
Nonbarrable Share: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 682 (1966)
(discussing soundness of non-community property type spousal protection).
251. Compare Buehrle v. Buehrle, 126 N.E. 539 (Ill. 1920) with Keats v. Cates, 241
N.E.2d 645 (I11. App. Ct. 1968). In Buehrle, the parties to the contract were the testator
and his brother. Id. at 539. The court found the surviving spouse's rights superior, al-
lowing her to renounce the will and take her intestate share. Id. at 540. In Keats, the
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edge of the contract by the surviving spouse is not a determinative fac-
tor.252 If such results are based on the idea that the equities favor the
spouse who was married to the testator for the longer period of time,
then they are wholly inconsistent with the overwhelmingly legislated rule
that a surviving spouse is entitled to protection regardless of length of
marriage. Additionally, it is not always true that the first marriage is of
longer duration than a subsequent marriage.
One difficult problem in resolving the conflict is the sense that the eq-
uities favor the contract beneficiaries in the case of a short-duration mar-
riage and the surviving spouse in the case of a long-term marriage.253
Thus, decisions like those of the New York Court of Appeals, favoring
the contract beneficiaries of a contractual will executed during a marriage
of almost fifty years over the elective share rights of the promisor's sur-
viving second spouse to whom the promisor was married for only fifteen
months do not shock the conscience.254 Most courts, however, do not
draw distinctions based on length of marriage when resolving the conflict.
Hence, one hopes that in the interest of analytical consistency, perhaps
the New York court would favor the contract beneficiaries even in the
case of a short-duration first marriage followed by a long-duration second
marriage with a will contract made during the first marriage. This diffi-
culty helps to illustrate the soundness of the Uniform Probate Code's re-
designed elective share.255
Under the U.P.C., the percentage of the augmented estate2 56 to which
a surviving spouse is entitled varies with the length of the marriage. 57
The percentages suggested in section 2-202 range from zero in the case of
a marriage of less than one year to fifty for a marriage lasting fifteen
parties to the contract were the testator and his first wife. Keats, 241 N.E.2d at 649. The
court found the second wife's rights inferior, allowing the contract beneficiaries to take the
estate. Id. at 653.
252. Keats, 241 N.E.2d at 652.
253. For an example of an extremely short-term marriage, see Neiderhiser Estate, 2 Pa.
D. & C.3d 302 (1977) (widow entitled to letters of administration after husband died dur-
ing wedding ceremony).
254. See Rubenstein v. Mueller, 225 N.E.2d 540, 543 (N.Y. 1967).
255. See UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-201 to -207 (1993). These sections were revised in
1993 to emphasize partnership theory and reform the elective share system. Id.; see Wag-
goner, supra note 5, at 715-24; Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 93, at 303. Professors
Langbein and Waggoner suggest that even the reform wave that followed decisions like
Newman v. Dore did not alleviate major problems in elective share laws, especially the
inequity relating to duration of marriage. Id. at 310-12.
256. UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-203, 2-205 (1993). The revised U.P.C. goes so far as to
create a combined augmented estate. Id. § 2-203. Section 2-203 calculates the elective
share as a portion of the decedent's and surviving spouse's combined augmented estates.
Id.
257. Id. § 2-202(a) (charting the entitlements).
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years or more.258 In addition, section 2-202(b) permits a legislature to
add a supplemental elective share amount so that any surviving spouse
would receive a minimum dollar amount regardless of the length of the
marriage. 25 9 The comment to section 2-202 makes clear that the increas-
ing percentage component implements the partnership theory of mar-
riage while the supplemental amount implements the support theory of
the elective share.26°
This is not to suggest, however, that it is inappropriate to allow spousal
protection to prevail over rights under a will contract in a jurisdiction that
offers full spousal protection to the surviving spouse of a short-term mar-
riage. Like many jurisdictions that have chosen to eliminate misconduct
as a disqualifying factor in spousal protection cases,26' most states do not
consider length of marriage in assessing a surviving spouse's entitlement
to protection.
In addition, the use of property law principles represents nothing more
than a game of smoke and mirrors. A contract to make a will does not
deprive the promisor of lifetime rights in his property in any meaningful
way. The idea that title vests immediately in the promisee or third-party
beneficiary is equally ephemeral. The contract beneficiary has no mean-
ingful property interest until the promisor dies. This combination of the
promisor losing nothing while alive and the beneficiary enjoying the
property only at the promisor's death compels the conclusion that the
attempt to treat a contract to make a will as anything other than a testa-
mentary act is pure legal fiction.262
Thus, in almost every case, the rights of a surviving spouse to protec-
tion should prevail over the rights of a promisee or third-party benefici-
ary of a will contract. There is, however, one fairly limited situation in
which the surviving spouse should not be permitted to claim spousal pro-
tection to the detriment of the will contract's beneficiary, and one issue
258. Id.
259. Id. § 2-202(b); see also Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 93, at 319-20 (suggesting
that $50,000 would provide a person in his or her mid-70s with enough funds to subsist).
260. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202 cmt.; see also Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 93, at
314-17 (discussing accrual-type forced share).
261. See Hall v. Jeffers, 795 S.W.2d 135, 138 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (noting misconduct
not a bar to distributive share); see also Oldham, supra note 94, at 243 (suggesting surviv-
ing spouse's behavior during marriage should not be considered in determining post-death
support).
262. See Estate of Stewart v. Van Noy, 444 P.2d 337, 342 (Cal. 1968) (en banc) (Mc-
Comb, J., dissenting) (stating that "[r]egardless of the separate nature of a contract and a
will, a contract to make disposition of property by will for all practical purposes amounts to
a testamentary disposition"); Church of Christ Home for Aged, Inc. v. Nashville Trust Co.,
202 S.W.2d 178, 181 (Tenn. 1947) (noting will and contract are "completely dependent
upon each other").
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concerning the amount to which the surviving spouse is entitled. The one
situation where the surviving spouse should not be permitted to claim
spousal protection to the detriment of the beneficiaries of a will contract
is fairly limited. When the surviving spouse claiming the protection is a
promisor of the will contract, he or she should not be permitted to frus-
trate the purpose of the contract by electing against the other promisor's
will.
2 6 3
To allow the contract beneficiaries to prevail in such circumstances
does not harm the integrity of spousal protection. Rather, it recognizes
that a contract to make a particular disposition of property is tantamount
to an agreement waiving any contradictory rights that the promisor may
have had in the property.
Regarding the surviving spouse's amount of entitlement, an interesting
situation arises when the promisor dies intestate. In such cases, the sur-
viving spouse should be limited to receiving what he or she would have
received by electing against a will drafted to comport with the terms of
the contract. The spouse should not receive the intestate share. This em-
bodies the logical solution because the spouse of a promisor who
breaches a contract to make a will should not be placed in a better posi-
tion than the spouse of a promisor who performs under the contract. This
recognizes the idea that a contract to make a will is primarily testamen-
tary-it is an agreement to make a testamentary disposition to someone
other than the spouse. It also represents a recognition of the fact that
making a will to exclude the surviving spouse and entering into a contract
to exclude the surviving spouse are parallel courses of action.
Further, intestacy statutes constitute legislative attempts at executing
the presumed dispositive intentions of a person who dies without a valid
will.2 64 Studies have shown overwhelmingly that a testator leaving a sur-
viving spouse will likely give the entire estate to the surviving spouse.2 65
263. The Supreme Court of Iowa was faced with this situation in Luthy v. Seaburn, 46
N.W.2d 44 (Iowa 1951). In Luthy, the surviving spouse, who was also the other party to a
contract to execute mutual wills, attempted to elect against his dead spouse's will. Id. at
45. The court refused to allow the surviving spouse to rescind the contract by electing
against the will. Id. at 48; see also Nashville Trust Co., 202 S.W.2d at 183 (noting wife's
dissent from will was breach of agreement); Seat v. Seat, 113 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Tenn. 1938)
(refusing to allow wife to repudiate contract by dissenting from deceased husband's will).
264. See Waggoner, supra note 5, at 703-04. Professor Waggoner suggests that
although a mixture of considerations should drive formulation of intestacy statutes, dece-
dent's imputed intent is an "obvious and perhaps predominant consideration." Id.
265. See Olin L. Browder, Jr., Recent Patterns of Testate Succession in the United States
and England, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1303, 1307-08 (1969) (citing statistics that show testates
tend to leave everything to their spouses, even when both spouse and issue survive); John
R. Price, The Transmission of Wealth at Death in a Community Property Jurisdiction, 50
WASH. L. REv. 277, 283, 311-17 (1975) (concluding from data obtained in Washington
[Vol. 45:435
Will Contracts
A legislature looking at such studies probably would conclude that most
people would bestow their entire estate to a surviving spouse. Thus, the
fact that most intestacy statutes favor a surviving spouse over other sur-
viving relatives probably represents more a result of recognition of a typi-
cal pattern of disposition than a desire to protect the spouse.
A similar argument can be made with respect to a surviving spouse
who claims protection as a pretermitted spouse. Again, the surviving
spouse should be limited to the protection that he or she would have
received had the deceased spouse written a will conforming to the con-
tract because the premise underlying the pretermitted spouse statutes is
that the decedent unintentionally omitted the spouse. The existence of
the will contract, however, suggests that the deceased spouse was contrac-
266tually obligated to intentionally omit the surviving spouse. Because a
jurisdiction designs spousal protection to address intentional disinheri-
tance, the surviving spouse should receive only that amount.
Further, the focus of some courts on whether the surviving spouse
knew of the contract's existence to determine whether the surviving
spouse should receive a portion of the promisor's estate is not only illogi-
cal, but also undesirable as a matter of public policy. A court should not
deem a spouse to have waived the right to spousal protection at death
merely because he or she knows that a will contract exists. To so suggest
might even be viewed as a restraint on marriage because it implies that
the spouse had the power to avoid the effect of the contract by not mar-
rying. Rather, a court should find the surviving spouse to have waived
the right to spousal protection only if he or she voluntarily relinquishes
such right in accordance with the law of the relevant jurisdiction regard-
ing agreements affecting marital rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, a testator should not be permitted to contract to do that which
he cannot otherwise do-completely disinherit his spouse.26 7 Every j uris
diction in the United States has decided that protection of the surviving
State that, like other jurisdictions, a very high percentage of decedents transferred their
entire estates to their surviving spouses).
266. See Estate of Beauchamp v. Eichenberger, 564 P.2d 908, 910 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)
(holding second wife was pretermitted spouse even though husband was contractually
bound to leave entire estate to children, and concluding that children should prevail).
267. See In re Estate of Mullin, 443 P.2d 331, 338 (Kan. 1968). The Mullin court held
that a person could neither deprive a surviving spouse of protection by writing a will disin-
heriting the surviving spouse nor by contracting to write such a will. Id. at 338.
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spouse is a worthy aim.268 If a court allows the contract beneficiary's
rights to prevail over the surviving spouse's rights, then a spouse in that
jurisdiction has access to an extremely useful tool for defeating the
spousal share.269 Such circumvention of the principle of spousal protec-
tion should not be tolerated.
268. See supra note 108. As previously noted, Georgia's protection of surviving spouses
is extremely limited.
269. Fleming v. Fleming, 180 N.W. 206 (Iowa), reh'g overruled, 180 N.W. 206 (Iowa
1920), modified, 184 N.W. 296 (Iowa 1921). In holding that the surviving spouse's rights
prevailed, the Fleming court noted that the governing statute left no room for such an
ingenious attempt to defeat spousal rights. Id. at 208. It also noted that spousal rights are
impregnable or not existent. Id.
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